

The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXXIV, No. 872

March 12, 1956



FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION 403

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT • Statement by Secretary Dulles 415

VISIT OF ITALIAN PRESIDENT GRONCHI • Texts of Statements and Addresses 417

U.S. TRADE POLICY AND PROBLEMS • by Ambassador Robert D. Cas 429

UNITED EFFORTS TO MEET THE WORLD AGRICULTURAL SITUATION • Article by Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butts 434

For index see inside back cover



The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 872 • PUBLICATION 6303

March 12, 1956

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1955).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

n

First Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Press release 108 dated March 1

Foreword

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila on 8th September, 1954² came into force on 19th February, 1955, following the deposit of ratifications by the eight member countries—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus one year has passed in SEATO's history—a year of planning and of organization. This report is issued by the SEATO Council Representatives on the eve of the second meeting of the Council of Ministers to explain the purposes and functions of SEATO, to record the progress made in the course of the Organization's first year and to examine the outlook for the future.

Introduction

SEATO is a defensive alliance by which Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States cooperate to provide for their security against further armed aggression, and also against subversion, in Southeast Asia and to promote the economic progress and social well-being of their peoples.

The Council Representatives find that substantial progress has been made towards these objectives.

First, the Council Representatives are convinced that the determination of the members to prevent and deter further aggressive expansion into Southeast Asia by armed force and subversion has made an important contribution to the preservation of peace in the area.

Second, under the protection of the Treaty all

member states have registered significant progress in their economic development. The Council Representatives recognize that this progress is the cumulative effect of the efforts of the governments themselves and the contributions of the Colombo Plan, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and bilateral aid programs. Under various programs of mutual assistance, member states have in the past two years made more than \$700,000,000 available to countries covered by the Treaty, apart from financial assistance for military purposes.

Third, there has been definite progress in the combat effectiveness of the armed forces of SEATO members. Extensive military aid programs under the Treaty's mutual aid provisions have played an important role in this. The plans of the Military Advisers for the coordinated use of these forces in an emergency are now taking firm shape.

Fourth, progress has been made in countering Communist subversion, although it remains a major threat to the area. The SEATO organization provides its members with an increasingly useful forum for consultation and planning measures of mutual support. Direct cooperation between member governments has increased.

The Treaty has thus provided an element of security indispensable to economic, social and cultural progress and has been an effective stabilizing influence.

The Origin and Nature of SEATO

When World War II ended, the peace which people everywhere desired did not come to Asia. In many parts of Asia a pattern of Communist inspired insurrection and aggression developed, culminating in the violent assault on the territory of South Korea.

In the Philippines, a subversive movement, in-

¹ Released on Mar. 1 at Washington, Canberra, Paris, Wellington, Karachi, Manila, Bangkok, and London.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

stigated and abetted by Communists, attempted to undermine the government.

In Malaya, terrorists endeavored to spread the scourge of international Communism by methods of murder and intimidation. Seeking to obtain by force what they could not gain by persuasion—domination of the Malayan independence movement—they stood revealed before the world as alien inspired and alien directed.

In Indochina, the Communist-led Viet Minh movement after a period of terrorism waged full-scale war to bring the countries of that area within the Communist orbit. This campaign, aided from without, reached its climax in the Viet Minh offensive of 1954, which coincided with the opening of the Geneva Conference.

Against this sombre background, representatives of eight Governments met at Manila in September, 1954. They decided that their countries should form an alliance to ensure their mutual safety. They considered such an alliance essential for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia. They emphasized that it was entirely defensive in its aims and would strengthen the ability of member countries to resist aggression. Its members pledged that it would never be used for purposes of aggression. But while in its origin it is based on self-defense its aims are constructive and extend far beyond the military field.

The SEATO Governments were firmly resolved to resist subversion and other forms of aggression by which men's minds are warped and their will to resist weakened. They recognized that, in the long run, subversion is as great a threat to national independence as overt military aggression.

The SEATO States also emphasized their desire to improve the economic, cultural and social well-being of their people. They made these objectives clear in Article 3 of the Manila Treaty and in a separate declaration of governing principles called the Pacific Charter.³ The declaration proclaims SEATO's basic principles in relation to equal rights, self-determination, self-government and national independence.

In the Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, the eight member governments agreed to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacities to resist armed aggression and subversion directed from without. They also stressed their intention to build up better understanding

between their people and to promote economic and social progress.

The signatory Governments agreed that, in the event of aggression against any of the parties, each would take action to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes. For the purposes of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet-Nam were designated as areas, attack against which would endanger the peace and safety of member countries. The Treaty also made provision for consultation between the signatory Governments in the event of a threat to any member State or to any designated States or territory. The Treaty stressed that action could only take place on the territory of a designated State at that State's invitation or with its consent.

With the signing of the Treaty the eight member countries, all members of the United Nations, reaffirmed their determination to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter and recognized the responsibilities of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Self-Help and Mutual Aid

In the "self-help and mutual aid" articles of the Treaty, the members of SEATO pledged themselves to take steps individually, and to help one another to develop their capacity to meet an armed attack and to foil attempts at subversion. They also undertook to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another for the economic progress and social well-being of their peoples.

What has been done since the Treaty was signed to carry out these undertakings?

In the military sphere there has been a definite increase in the overall capacity of member governments to resist armed aggression in the Treaty area. This has resulted primarily from the devotion by governments of considerable effort and resources to increasing the combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Modernization, re-equipment, more efficient disposition and more intensive training of forces have been the main themes.

A most important contribution to the success of these efforts has been made by mutual aid programs. Thus, there has been a considerable increase in the military assistance rendered by the United States to Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand under bilateral arrangements. This as-

³ *Ibid.*

sistance has taken various forms—including free supply of equipment, financial assistance in meeting defense costs, the training of personnel in the United States and in their own countries. Under the last heading almost 11,000 officers and non-commissioned officers from the SEATO area had completed or were attending United States operated service schools in the first nine months of 1955. Officer cadets from Thailand and Pakistan have also attended military schools in France and the United Kingdom too has trained naval, army and air force personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Thailand.

The danger of subversion today confronts governments throughout the Treaty area. Nevertheless, the appropriate authorities in all of the member governments are keeping an increasingly effective watch over Communist activities. Measures are being taken to increase the ability of police and security forces to deal with subversive Communist activities. Governments and national information services have increasingly directed their efforts at exposing and countering Communist propaganda.

This is in part a battle for minds—a battle which in the last resort must be won by each nation in its own country and with its own political and psychological resources. But even here there is much that governments can do to assist one another by putting the special experience of countering the subversive threat in their respective countries at the service of their SEATO allies. Several mutual aid programs in training security forces are under way. Exchanges of information on Communist subversive activities are playing an ever more important role.

Besides the threat from subversion, some of the countries of the area are faced with armed violence in various forms, but the danger these pose to the security of the countries concerned has been diminished as the result of continued and effective counteraction. In the Philippines, the Communist led Hukbalahaps have been reduced to virtual impotence. In Malaya the Communist terrorists in the jungle, against whom a sustained and increasingly successful war is being waged, have failed to halt the peaceful development of the Federation.

Member governments have continued their efforts to promote economic progress and social well-being in the area. Generally increasing public expenditure has contributed to an accelerated rate

of development in the member countries. Economic aid programs have made a major contribution. For example, the United States has allocated approximately \$500 million in economic aid to the Treaty area on a bilateral basis since June 30, 1954. Moreover, it was recognized by the Council at their meeting in Bangkok in February 1955⁴ that certain economic matters such as trade, payments, development, investment and sound economic progress involved a wider area than that covered by the Treaty and desirably included cooperation with many friendly states as well as the member states. Such cooperation, through the United Nations, its specialized agencies, including the International Bank, and through the Colombo Plan, has played an important part in furthering the economic progress of the Treaty area. Altogether somewhere between \$800 and \$900 million has been made available in the past two years to countries of the Treaty area in economic assistance.

SEATO at Work

This is the structure of the Treaty Organization.

1. Article V of the Treaty set up

The Council of Foreign Ministers who meet at least once a year, usually in the Treaty area, to set the broad policy for the implementation of the Treaty.

2. At their first meeting in Bangkok from February 23-25, 1955, the Council decided to set up

The Council Representatives who carry on the business of the Treaty Organization when the Council is not in session within terms of reference laid down by the Council. They meet in Bangkok, usually at least every two weeks.

The Military Advisers advise the Council on measures for the common defense. Through various sub-committees and periodic meetings of the Advisers, they make plans to resist attacks against the territory of member states in the area.

3. Three Committees work under the general direction of the Council Representatives. They meet several times a year, usually in the Treaty area.

The Committee of Security Experts is a highly expert group of specialists dealing with certain problems of subversion directed from the outside.

The Committee of Economic Experts serve as the principal advisers of the organization in the economic sphere.

⁴For text of communique, see *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

The Committee on Information, Cultural, Education and Labor Activities provides expert advice on the SEATO activities indicated by its title.

Until more permanent arrangements are made, the Royal Thai Government have kindly provided a provisional *Executive Secretariat*, currently headed by an official of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vadhana Isarabhakdi, which is located at Bangkok and has very efficiently serviced the meetings of the Council Representatives and of the Committees. The Council Representatives take this opportunity to express their sincere thanks to the Royal Thai Government for their generosity and hospitality.

The Council Representatives recently appointed a *Public Relations Officer*, Mr. Narciso Reyes of the Philippines, who is also located at Bangkok. Mr. Reyes is an official of the Philippine Government, which has generously contributed his services for this post pending more permanent arrangements.

SEATO states recognize that Communist subversion still constitutes a major threat to the peace and security of the Treaty area. Because subversion manifests itself in so many ways, it is naturally a concern of all elements of the organization. The Council Representatives have established the Committee of Security Experts primarily to help them deal with particular technical aspects of counter subversion work. This Committee has met three times. At a joint meeting with the military authorities, agreement was reached on the best method of dealing with subversive problems of interest to both civil and military branches of the Organization.

The Information Committee deals not only with information but also with social, educational, labor and cultural problems and with the provision of technical aid in these fields. At its first meeting in May, 1955, the Committee asked member countries to submit detailed reports on information projects, social and labor legislation, and technical resources. On the basis of this survey the second meeting of the Committee at Bangkok in January 1956 was able to analyze and tabulate SEATO resources which could be made available to assist member states in the development of their information and cultural activities. Thus, each member government which finds that it needs assistance of a particular kind knows immediately to which other nation it can turn. The Committee also

drew up a program to publicize the aims and work of SEATO and to counter hostile propaganda. In the labor field, recommendations were made to member governments on measures to encourage the development of free trade union movements and to promote a continuing exchange of information concerning progress in the fields of labor legislation and trade union development.

Member nations have bound themselves together by Treaty because they have common ideals and hopes for the future of their peoples and are determined to resist interference with peaceful progress towards their goal. History shows that evil can only be overcome by a positive faith. SEATO has such a faith. It is that each member nation should be free to work out its own destiny in its own way without interference from subversion directed from without or from aggressive propaganda by militant ideologies. Consequently, the need is both to stress the positive side of SEATO's work and to make the people of the area aware of the extent and nature of Communist propaganda, the aim of which is to jeopardize those very freedoms. SEATO is fully resolved to promote closer contacts between member states so that they can face the challenge of subversion with a feeling of mutual solidarity.

At its first meeting in February 1955 the Council of Ministers agreed upon the importance of implementing Article 3 of the Treaty. This Article is specifically designed to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments towards these ends. From the outset the Economic Committee has given particular attention to special economic questions arising out of the Treaty commitments of the members, such as the impact of defense costs on national economies. In doing so it has kept firmly in mind the broad objective of promoting the general economic progress and prosperity of member nations.

The Military Advisers met for the first time at Bangkok in February, 1955, in conjunction with the first Council Meeting, and exchanged views concerning the military aspects of the Treaty. They decided that their Staff Planners should meet shortly afterwards at Baguio in the Philippines to initiate planning in the military field and prepare a programme of future work as necessary steps in the ultimate development of plans for the implementation of certain defense aspects of the Treaty.

The Staff Planners further determined a need for study in technical and specialized fields. As a result, eight subcommittees were set up to deal with technical and specialized subjects.

In July, 1955, the Military Advisers met again at Bangkok and approved the program of work prepared by the Staff Planners. Much work has since been done in putting this into effect.

The various military committees have held meetings throughout the past year in places ranging from Karachi to Auckland and to Pearl Harbor. In addition to the normal processes of military planning, committees have met to decide what measure of standardization can be achieved in the organization, methods of training and equipment of the member nations. Particular attention has also been paid to the provision of training facilities by one nation to assist the forces of another, both in technical and specialist subjects.

It has been most gratifying to the Military Advisers to see how closely the armed forces are cooperating and what a great measure of mutual trust and confidence has grown up between them.

The great distances which separate the member countries do not make it easy to arrange for joint exercises to take place, but a start has already been made in this important field. In June, 1955, observers of all the SEATO Nations participated in Commonwealth Naval Exercises in the waters between Singapore and Bangkok in which units of the Powers' maritime air forces also took part. At the conclusion of the exercise visits were paid by the participating forces to the ports of Bangkok and Manila. The presence of a Pakistan Naval squadron in Far Eastern waters has also enabled them to participate in joint exercises. At the invitation of the Royal Thai Government, a joint exercise was held in and around Bangkok in February 1956.

Recently the Staff Planners met at Pearl Harbor to review the work of their committees and their report was considered by the Military Advisers at their meeting in Melbourne in January, 1956. At this meeting, they approved the various studies made by their Staff Planners and the reports of the various committees which had met since July, 1955. This completed the first full year's activity by the Military Advisers and their staffs and has ensured that the SEATO military organization and planning can develop smoothly and efficiently in the future.

Thus, the work with which the Military Ad-

visers were entrusted by the Council is making good progress. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty made it clear that the member governments were determined to stand together to resist any act of aggression directed against the peace and security of the Treaty area. The military side of the organization has as its task to ensure that no aggressor can rely upon a lack of cohesion between the military planning of the Treaty Nations. This the Military Advisers are putting into practice.

SEATO Looks Ahead

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is of indefinite duration. SEATO is now one year old and in that time a great deal of progress has been made. It is anticipated that the coming year will see a number of developments in the organization, which will increase its efficiency and the scope of its work. Various proposals submitted by the Council Representatives and the Military Advisers will be considered by the Foreign Ministers at their forthcoming meeting in Karachi.

The political situation in the area has also developed during the year. In the Pacific Charter and in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signatory members reaffirmed that they upheld the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Moreover they declared that they would strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose people desire it and who are able to undertake its responsibilities. With this in mind the Council Representatives have welcomed the steps in train in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore towards this goal. At the conclusion on February 8, 1956, of a conference of representatives of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of the Federation Government recommendations were made which, if accepted according to constitutional procedure, will result in the Federation becoming internally self-governing in the very near future. Further steps are also envisaged so that by August 1957 it is intended that the Federation should be fully self-governing and independent within the Commonwealth. In Singapore there is already a majority of elected Ministers in the Government and a delegation will go to London in April 1956 for discussions about further constitutional progress there too.

In 1954 the shadow of armed Communism lay

over the States of Indochina. The conclusion of the Geneva Agreements in July of that year brought to an end active military operations and International Commissions were established to supervise the Armistice. Since that time election or referenda have taken place. Under the stabilizing influence of the Treaty, and with material and moral assistance from the members of SEATO, the Governments and peoples of these countries, the security of which is of special importance to members of SEATO, have brought about notable improvements in the general political situation. Nevertheless, the evidence of continued subversive activities in certain areas of Indochina in which can be seen the hand of the Viet Minh, is very disquieting.

The work of SEATO has so far been of necessity preparatory. In the forthcoming year it will pass into the fields of achievement. As a result of the collection and collation of information in the economic, social, publicity and labor fields it will now be possible to take practical steps to advance the work of the Organization and of member governments in these fields.

Much has been done to develop understanding and friendship between the peoples of the member nations through exchanges of official and private visits. Moreover within SEATO itself a spirit of good fellowship has grown up as a result of the frequent meetings of the representatives of the member countries. But the Council Representatives hope that this spirit can be extended by widening the scope of these exchanges. In this way each nation will achieve a better understanding of the problems and way of life of its neighbors.

While developing these positive plans for peaceful progress the SEATO countries must increase their capacity to deter would-be aggressors by building up a vigorous collective defense system.

At the same time the Council Representatives realize that Communist subversion remains a major threat to the area. However, the experience and assistance which can be made available by member governments to each other through the Treaty Organization will help to increase the confidence and efficiency of the responsible authorities in member states in carrying out their vital work of counter-subversion.

The objectives of SEATO will not be realized until the peoples of the member nations know that their defense against any aggressor is assured; that their

social and economic lot has been improved; and that the internal structure of their countries has been so strengthened as to ensure that subversion directed from without cannot succeed.

Meanwhile SEATO enters its second year of life with a high sense of optimism based on the knowledge of what has already been achieved.

U.S. Delegation Leaves for SEATO Council Meeting

SECRETARY DULLES' DEPARTURE STATEMENT

Press release 112 dated March 2

I am leaving for Karachi to attend the second meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

It has been just a year since the first Council meeting was held in Bangkok.¹ In this year the organization, comprised of eight countries, east and west, has made substantial progress in establishing collective self-defense in that region and advancing the cause of a secure peace together with freedom and independence.

This trip affords me an opportunity to visit other countries in Asia.² I am looking forward to talking with the leaders and peoples of these Asian countries and studying sympathetically at first hand their problems.

I hope to be able to inform myself further of the seeming shift in Soviet Communist tactics. I shall emphasize in the countries I visit that the United States is the real friend of free Asia and that it can count upon us and that we have an understanding regard for the aspirations of its people to obtain the blessings of peace and freedom.

MEMBERS OF U.S. DELEGATION

Press release 102 dated February 29

U.S. Representative

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

Special Assistant

William B. Macomber

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

² For the Secretary's itinerary, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 241.

Coordinator

Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor, Department of State

Deputy Coordinator

Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

Senior Advisers

George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs

Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Director for Policy and Programs, United States Information Agency

Max W. Bishop, U.S. Council Representative and Ambassador to Thailand

Robert R. Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Elbridge Durbrow, U.S. Consul General, Singapore

Horace A. Hildreth, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan

Carl W. McCordle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Adm. Felix B. Stump, USN, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific

Charles A. Sullivan, Director, Office of Special International Affairs, Department of Defense

Advisers

James D. Bell

John O. Bell

Douglas M. Cairns, Col., USAF

William J. Galloway

Robert A. Hewitt, Col., USA

John C. Hill

Robert Jantzen

James L. Meader

John F. Pickering

Hugh Queenin, Lt. Col., USA

J. A. Scott, Capt., USN

R. Jack Smith

William V. Turnage

William Witman, II

Secretary of Delegation

Bruce Grainger

Reports Officers

Eugene V. McAuliffe

Roger Kirk

Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee which dealt with State Department appropriations. We have always found that he was conscientious, sympathetic, and understanding of the needs of the Department, and his loss is very deeply regretted by us all.

I suspect most of you know I am leaving on Friday—I think at 2 o'clock—for a trip to South Asia and the Far East that will take me to 10 countries, 2 of which I have never visited before, Ceylon and Indonesia. The primary purpose of the trip is to attend the meeting of the SEATO Council which will be held at Karachi. I think we will at that meeting record progress that has been made during the past year and map out programs for new progress for the future, giving increasing strength and vitality to that very important organization for the security of Southeast Asia.

There and in the other countries I will have a chance to appraise at first hand the new Soviet and Chinese Communist tactics and will perhaps come back better prepared and more fully informed to help to shape U.S. policy to take account of those new tactics.

That is all I care to say. Do you have any questions?

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested by your Democratic critics that you have been too optimistic in your appraisal of the success or lack of success of these tactics. Would you say that you have been too optimistic?

A. I would not say so. I feel that, if what I have said is considered as a whole, it strikes a fair balance. I don't want here to get into a political controversy or to turn these press conferences into an arena for political controversy. But I think I could say fairly as dealing with the substance of the matter and not on a political basis that I do feel that a very considerable result has been accomplished over the past 10 years.

I looked back the other day to an article on Soviet foreign policy and what to do about it, which I wrote 10 years ago. In it I pointed out that, if the Soviet policy continued to emphasize intolerance and dependence on violence, it would almost surely lead to a third world war. I said that American foreign policy for the next few years must be devoted to getting the Soviets to give up those elements of violence and intoler-

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 100 dated February 28

Secretary Dulles: I want first of all to express on behalf of myself and my associates in the State Department our deep sorrow at the death of Senator Kilgore. He was associated with the State Department in many ways, most notably as the

March 12, 1956

ance. And in my book, which I wrote 6 years ago, I said that I hoped the time would come when such volumes as Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*, which taught Stalinism, would no longer be accepted as a "bible" within the Soviet Union, and that if that result could be brought about there would be a greatly decreased likelihood that the competition—the rivalry—between our countries would lead to war.

Therefore, I believe that the strength and stability of the free world is demonstrated over these last 10 years. They have been hard years where we have had war—we fought the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists, and we have been close to war in relation to Berlin and Greece, and other places. To have gotten through that decade and to see now a very considerable revision of the Soviet policy and a very considerable burying of Stalinism—that to my mind is ground for satisfaction, and there is in it a reward for all the sacrifices that have been made by the American people and our allies during this past 10-year period.

Of course, as I made clear in my speech on Sunday,¹ this does not mean that the struggle is over. One round is perhaps over, assuming these Soviet changes are persisted in. The second round may be beginning. The second round will be different in character from the first or may be, and, as I said in my speech on Sunday, an attitude of complacency would be disastrous. I certainly do not preach any attitude of complacency. There is a continuing Soviet purpose of predatory character, as I pointed out on Sunday, in the Soviet present tactics and more guile, although perhaps less force, than heretofore. Therefore, it is necessary to be fully alert to meet that problem, and we may have to adapt our own policies to it. But I think it is fair to say to the American people that all the sacrifice which they have made not only in treasure but in blood during this past 10 years has at least brought about a change which can mark a first installment toward a Russia that will be a decent member of the society of nations, which is our ultimate goal.

Adapting to Soviet Tactics

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask one more question? You have implied in two comments, one on your trip to Southeast Asia and the Far East, and the other in what you just said, that you think you may

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363.

find it necessary to have further adaptation or change of American policy to meet the new Soviet tactics on the second round.

A. Yes, I have said here some time ago, I have said in my testimony before the Senate on Friday,² and I said in my speech on Sunday, that it is going to be quite important to have two things, greater flexibility and greater assurance of continuity. I believe those two elements are quite indispensable. I said there that without those two elements we incur serious risks, a risk which I consider to be quite unjustifiable relative to the small cost of eliminating that risk. We may need somewhat larger amounts, although we do not estimate that is substantial at the present time. We are seeking, as I pointed out, approximately \$100 million more for the economic side of our mutual security program than we have for this year, and that represents only a fractional percentage of the total.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your Philadelphia speech you used the phrase "several years" in connection with the long-range foreign economic aid program. Will the administration ask for legislation authorizing such commitments over a specific number of years, say, 10, in the special message that is going up soon?

A. That message has not been finally formulated as yet, but I think we will probably specify the number of years. It will not necessarily be 10 but will be something of that general order—somewhere between 5 and 10, I expect.

Q. Mr. Secretary, apart from possible partisan aspects of the speech, Senator Fulbright has associated himself with you in support of long-term foreign aid. However, in the speech that he made on the floor of the Senate yesterday he said, or asked, roughly, "Have not the people been provided by the Secretary of State with a reason for resisting such outlays"—referring to foreign aid authorizations—"on the ground that the Secretary of State by his testimony Friday said that Soviet designs had been frustrated already"? My question, sir, is in two parts. Do you have any comment on that? And (b), in the light of developments, would you amend or change any of the statements you made before the committee on Friday?

A. I don't care to comment on what Senator

² *Ibid.*, p. 368.

Fulbright said. I believe that, if what I said on Friday and what I said on Sunday is read as a whole, it is very clear. I hope and I think that it will constitute a very strong and persuasive argument, to the American people and to Congress, to give the increased flexibility, the increased continuity, and the slightly increased amount which we expect to ask for in the way of economic funds.

Soviet Parliamentary Maneuvering

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech on Sunday you identified, it seemed to me, two plain menaces in the Soviet tactics, one foreign economic assistance and one the parliamentary maneuvering. You dealt with the economic matter. Could you talk with us about what can be done to deal with the united-front tactic?

A. Well, I would prefer not to comment on that, as I would have to do it extemporaneously here. It is a pretty delicate subject, touching, as it does, upon the internal politics of a good many other countries. Therefore I think anything I said on that subject ought to be pretty carefully weighed before I spoke on it. I believe that there is a general awareness within most of the countries where that political tactic is being proposed of the fact that it has considerable dangers. But beyond that comment I would prefer not to go at this time.

Q. Would you expect that at some time you might give it as full a treatment as you did the foreign economic problem on Sunday?

A. Perhaps not quite as full, because the foreign economic problem is primarily a matter for the United States. The other inevitably touches to a very considerable extent upon the internal politics and political affairs of other countries. But if I may find it within the limits of prudence, I can say something about it.

Q. Do you feel it can be dealt with?

A. In a public speech?

Q. No, that the problem can be dealt with.

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to greater flexibility and greater assurance of continuity, in talking about changes in our policy to meet the Soviet

policy, are you referring only to changes regarding foreign economic aid, or does that embrace other changes?

A. I was speaking of it primarily in terms of foreign economic aid, not perhaps limited wholly to the normal scope of our mutual security legislation, because it might also usefully include some modifications with reference to the disposal of agricultural surpluses. But in general I am talking about the greater flexibility to be given by Congress in the areas where it has the decision as to what will be the conditions and limitations under which economic aid can be dispensed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that Representative Richards was justified in saying that you treat the Senators like big boys and the House Members like kids?

A. Well, I don't want to comment on what Representative Richards said. He is a very fine Congressman and a very good personal friend of mine, and he is coming to lunch with me this week.

Q. Of course what he had in mind was that he was insinuating that you did not consult with his committee as much as you did with the Senate committee. Can you enlarge on that?

A. I believe that our consultations are pretty closely balanced between the two committees. Actually it is the committees themselves which largely determine when they want to hear me. As far as I know, I have been as responsive to them as I can be, having regard to my other obligations. I have met, I think, now since I have been Secretary of State for the last 3 years, upward of 120 times with bipartisan congressional groups, principally the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and while I haven't made a tabulation I would expect that it would show that it is about 50-50 as between the Senate and the House. Certainly there is no intention on my part to make any discrimination except for the fact that in certain areas, of course, such as treaty-making, the Senate does have a special constitutional authority which is not shared by the House. So that, perhaps, brings about a somewhat increased appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, particularly because we have had in the last few years quite a few treaties which I have had to deal with, and deal with almost exclusively with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

U.S. Policy Toward India

Q. Mr. Secretary, during Ambassador Cooper's recent visit here he made several speeches in which he suggested that American policy toward India maybe should be overhauled in all aspects—diplomatic, economic, and particularly personal relations. Did you discuss those things with him, and could you give us your views on our policy toward India?

A. The answer is I have discussed with him very fully not only here in the Department but he came around to my house one weekend and we spent a couple of hours talking over this whole situation. I look forward very much on this trip to the Far East to visiting New Delhi. He will be back there at that time, and I will have a chance to talk to Prime Minister Nehru. That might lead me to suggest some modifications. But as I now see the situation, I think the United States has on the whole adopted pretty reasonable policies toward India. We have made very substantial contributions to its first Five-Year Plan, and I hope, if Congress approves, we certainly will make further contributions to the second Five-Year Plan. I believe that, while there are superficial irritations, there is no reason why the relations of our two countries shouldn't be on a relation of friendliness and confidence.

Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you know, there is a lot of concern about the two agreements with our country—one with Saudi Arabia that permits them to veto American soldiers of Jewish faith and the other with Egypt that permits them to veto American firms that are blacklisted—and I was wondering if you think there is anything the American Government could do about either of those problems, beyond what has been done?

A. Those agreements—certainly the one with Saudi Arabia—were made prior to this administration. It is a difficult problem to cope with. We are trying to deal with it. It's like some other problems that we find here in the United States. They are not always easy to deal with quickly or abruptly. It requires a gradual process. We hope that there will be greater moderation and greater tolerance, but we cannot prescribe it from abroad or expect to bring it about suddenly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your testimony before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee seems to have been interpreted both in Israel and the Arab countries as an indication that there is no intention to approve Israel's arms request in the near future. Is that interpretation correct?

A. Well, I think I would have to let my statement speak for itself. I don't care to elaborate on it or add to it or subtract from it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have the Big Three powers agreed on a program of joint action in event of aggression by either side in the Middle East? There are reports to this effect from London.

A. Well, I heard of those reports. I think those reports go somewhat beyond anything that has yet been agreed upon. As was pointed out, I think at the time of the visit here of Sir Anthony Eden, there was an agreement that we should have an exchange of views as between the three members of the tripartite pact of 1950—that is, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States—to consider, broadly speaking, how we interpret it and how we would apply the provisions of that tripartite agreement. That exchange of views has been taking place and is still in process. But I think it would not be correct to say there has been anything like a war plan or anything of that sort that has been agreed to.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you say in the light of the agreement reached at the time the Prime Minister was here that there has been agreement on general lines of action up to this point?

A. There has been no attempt to formalize any agreement. I think that there is an increasing understanding of lines of action that might be followed. When I say that, I want to have it clearly understood that when I talk about lines of action I'm not just thinking about military action because, as I have several times pointed out, this seems to me to be peculiarly a problem where the United Nations should have an important place. Israel is a creation of the United Nations, and the original truce and the armistice agreements were negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. I feel that in a sense Israel is a ward of the United Nations. I'm looking forward to having a full talk on that aspect of the matter with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, who is lunching with me tomorrow, who has been to the area, and whose views I shall look forward to receiving with great interest.

Q. Has there been any reply from General Burns^a to the suggestion that his organization be provided with additional observers?

A. There has been no specific suggestion on his part as a result of our indication that we would respond to such a request. I do not exclude at all the possibility that he may ask for somewhat more observers, but he has not yet formulated any specific request.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the President discussed with you whether he should run again?

A. I don't report on my private talks with the President.

Q. Do you know whether he is going to?

A. I don't believe that is a proper subject for inquiry here.

Economic Cooperation

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your reappraisal of latest developments in Soviet policy, do you envisage that it may lead to a strengthening of, or giving greater emphasis to, the economic phase of NATO, which I understand has been advocated by President Gronchi and several other European leaders?

A. We have not had a chance yet to talk with President Gronchi. At least, I have not. He is, I believe, at this very minute talking at the White House, and I would be there were it not that I felt that, in view of the fact I had not had a press conference for several weeks and will not have another one for several weeks, I asked Under Secretary Hoover to attend that conference in my place. That subject may come up at that time.

My own general feeling is that, while the North Atlantic Treaty does deal to some extent with economic problems, in that it calls upon the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to cooperate among themselves, I think that the economic problems can be dealt with probably more effectively through organizations other than the North Atlantic Treaty. The membership of the North Atlantic Treaty was picked primarily, I would say, for strategic and military considerations and not for economic considerations. There is omission in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of some Western European countries who

are important from the standpoint of economics.

The OEEC, that is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, is set up primarily to deal with economic problems and may be a better forum for dealing with economic problems than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is. Then you have the problem of those economic problems which involve a special integration of certain European countries with each other, such as is represented by the present Coal and Steel Community, the prospects of a so-called EURATOM organization, and the prospects of a so-called common market. Those would be dealt with primarily by a lesser number of states than are in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, namely, by the six countries which are now members of the Coal and Steel Community. So that, while there are certain aspects of economic problems which can be properly dealt with by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I would think that in the main they would be dealt with more effectively on a cooperative basis by the OEEC and on an integration basis by the members of the Coal and Steel Community.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the hope of further contributions to India's second Five-Year Plan. Is that the type of thing that might be on a 2- or 3-year or some long-term basis rather than on a year-to-year basis?

A. Well, that would depend to some extent upon how it is handled. If it is handled in terms of a specific United States contribution to a particular long-term-project of India, then it could very well be comprehended within this suggestion of ours for greater continuity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does your feeling toward the economic strengthening of NATO also pertain to the economic phase of SEATO, where the different nations have different needs?

A. Somewhat the same problem exists there. We do have in our Southeast Asia Treaty perhaps somewhat stronger language with reference to economic matters than is in the North Atlantic Treaty. On the other hand again, the area covered by the treaty does not embrace all of the countries which fit into the optimum economic pattern for the area. For example, Japan, which could properly play a very considerable part there, is not in SEATO, and, of course, India and Burma and Indonesia are not members. Therefore, it is not

^a Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff, U.N. Truce Supervision Organization.

possible, I think, to work out an economic program for SEATO which wholly ignores the nonmembers, although there is a very considerable reason for giving special consideration, I think, to those countries which through an undertaking like SEATO have pledged themselves to help each other in a security way and which by so doing have perhaps incurred obligations which are not carried by nonmember countries.

Canada-Mexico-U.S. Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, what sort of problems might come up at the meetings next month between the leaders of the North American countries—Canada, the United States, and Mexico?

A. Well, they are not going to come to discuss any agenda or any agreed problems. There never has been yet a meeting of the heads of the Governments of the three great North American countries—Canada, Mexico, and the United States. There are problems which are of common interest, and it was thought by President Eisenhower that it would be useful for those three Heads of Government, which represent the three countries that embrace the North American continent, just to get together on a quite informal basis and chat together and develop a greater sense of fraternity and unity than has been the case heretofore. But there will not be any particular agenda, nor will it be directed to any particular problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything new on that trip that was planned last fall for Mr. Nixon through the Middle East? Any new developments on that?

A. No. That trip was planned for the fall, when the Congress was not in session. It would not be practical for the Vice President to take a trip while Congress is in session.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator George has consistently expressed opposition to this long-range aid program, and I wonder, in the light of that, whether you could appraise the prospects for getting this thing approved by the Congress?

A. Well, I think the prospects are good for getting in some form an assurance of continuity. Now, just what form that will take, I would not want to predict. But I believe it will be in a form which will in fact justify us in indicating a con-

tinuing interest in some of these specific projects to a degree which will in turn enable the countries concerned to pledge themselves to the consummation of these long-term projects and perhaps get some financial help from other quarters.

That is the important thing. We should be confident in our own mind that we will be able to carry forward, and that the countries who want to embark upon these things will be sufficiently confident that they will embark upon them and not feel that they run the risk that they will get a project into which they will put a lot of money and then they may have to abandon the project when it is only half completed.

Also, as I indicated, it is much easier to get money from other sources, such as the World Bank—perhaps even from private sources—if there is confidence the United States will make a substantial continuing contribution of its own. It may be even that it will be less costly for the United States to have this assurance of continuity than if we don't, because money from other sources will then become more readily available. I believe that that will be obtained, and I do not sense myself that the opposition of Senator George is such that he would not go along with some such program.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying in essence that we have reached a point where economic aid, meaning in a sense defense, is more important to us than our military defenses abroad?

A. Well, I do not think that we have yet reached a point where we could look with equanimity upon any substantial disbanding of the forces now maintained by such organizations as the NATO and its members. Much less so in the Far East, where there is perhaps a greater menace still of the use of violence against the countries that are close to the Soviet Union. That period may come. But until the Soviet policy and perhaps the Chinese Communist policy is more clearly in new grooves, I think it would be reckless for us to advocate or be acquiescent in any substantial reduction of the present military forces because the Soviet policy is in perhaps a transitional stage. It hasn't gone so far in the new direction that it could not quickly again be reoriented in the old direction.

I believe that all the evidence that we have, particularly from the studies of this 20th Soviet Congress, indicate that there probably is a per-

manent shift of direction. But, after all, that Congress only adjourned last Saturday night and we have not yet had an adequate opportunity either to appraise it fully or to see what the words

of that Congress mean when interpreted into actual teaching and acting within the Soviet Union.

Q. Thank you, sir.

The Problem of Disarmament

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

Disarmament is the most difficult and the most compelling of all world problems.

The difficulties are obvious. They are illustrated by the Treaty of Versailles, where elaborate—and futile—precautions were taken to prevent German rearmament; by the very limited Naval Agreement of 1922, which nevertheless was evaded; and by the prolonged and inconclusive negotiations of 1926 to 1933 for the reduction of armament as between the Allies of World War I.

Since those days, the problem has become immensely more complicated because of the growth and multiplicity of new weapons, coupled with intense distrust and new screens of secrecy as between major countries of the world.

One can, therefore, be easily tempted to say that acceptable limitation of armament is impossible of achievement.

However, we cannot and do not say that. The importance of solution has grown even more rapidly than the difficulty of solution.

The destructive power of modern weapons is such that a major war with those weapons would inevitably destroy a great part of the human race. So much is this realized that, so far as major war is concerned, there is developing a situation of mutual deterrence. But it would be reckless to assume that this is a permanently reliable preventive of war. Events could happen which would lead, perhaps by successive stages, to the use of these awesome weapons. The human race, if it desires to survive, must find a way to free itself of this constant menace of destruction which could

come about even through mistake or miscalculation.

Furthermore, the cost of modern weapons is constantly mounting so that the drain upon economic resources is reaching a measure which it will be intolerable to sustain.

The Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, called for the abandonment of the use of force "for realistic as well as spiritual reasons" and for "all . . . practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

The United Nations is required to promote the maintenance of international peace and security "with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources."²

The United States fully adheres to these principles, which, indeed, it cosponsored.

Furthermore, we insist, as a working hypothesis, that any problem that *must* be solved *can* be solved. Therefore, difficult as the problem of limitation of armament is, we assume that it can be solved, and we are determined to solve it.

It seems to us that the most effective approach to a solution of the problem of armament lies in trying to create conditions which will make armament seem less necessary.

President Eisenhower's Proposal

It was pursuant to that belief that President Eisenhower proposed at Geneva on July 21 of last year that as a major step toward limitation of armament the Soviet Union and ourselves,

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 29 (press release 101).

² U.N. doc. A/Res/383, adopted Dec. 16, 1955. For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 63.

initially, should provide each other with information as to our military establishments and provide facilities for unrestricted aerial reconnaissance of the other.

At the opening of the United Nations General Assembly last September, I said:³

Long experience makes it apparent that, when there is a sense of insecurity, when there is an ominous unknown, then arms seem needed and limitation of armament becomes virtually unattainable. Reductions of armament occur when fear is dissipated, when knowledge replaces exaggerated speculation, and when in consequence arms seem less needed.

The logic of this approach is simple and clear. Major aggression is unlikely unless the aggressor can have the advantage of surprise and can hope to strike a blow which will be devastating because unexpected. But the preparation of an attack of such magnitude can hardly be concealed from a combination of aerial and ground inspection. This, in turn, makes it unnecessary to maintain vast defensive forces in a constant state of up-to-the-minute alert.

Therefore the United States advocates as a first step a system of inspection so thoroughgoing and comprehensive that it will exclude for practical purposes a sudden surprise attack of devastating magnitude and give substantial advance notice of any preparation for such an attack.

We believe that if conditions can be created so that neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves feel in danger of a crippling surprise attack from the other, then potential power can to some extent replace actual force in being, and that would open the way to some substantial limitation of armament.

Margin of Error

We are quite aware of the fact that it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to arrive at a formula of limitation which would guarantee, with absolute precision, some agreed mathematical ratio or parity in different kinds of armament. Some margin of error must be accepted. But some error becomes acceptable under conditions where inspection gives assurance against a sudden surprise attack of serious proportions. In this matter, as in others, there are risks either way.

In the case of the Western European Union,

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 528.

created by the London and Paris Accords of 1954,⁴ a new and important step was taken toward the limitation of armament by the members. There was first of all agreement on a certain level of forces for the members of Western European Union. Then there was agreement that stocks of armaments should be held at quantitative levels appropriate to the agreed level of forces. Then there was established an agency for the control of armaments with authority to check and inspect the stocks of armaments in each member country, to be sure that they were not in excess of the quantities required by the level of forces that had been agreed to.

The underlying assumption was that it is easier to control armament than it is to control manpower, which is a particularly elusive factor having regard to the multiple possibilities of training, the establishment of reserves, "police," etc.

This scheme has, of course, not yet received a thoroughgoing test. But it holds good promise of possibilities and might perhaps be developed on an extended scale.

The high priority given to this problem by the United States is indicated by the designation by the President of Mr. Stassen as his personal representative to work on the problem. Mr. Stassen has already testified before this committee.⁵ You can be sure that his effort has the full support and cooperation of the Department of State and of myself personally.

We do not minimize the difficulties of dealing in these matters with a potential enemy who is untrustworthy and who in manifold ways has demonstrated that he is a past master at the art of evasion and secretiveness. We shall not jeopardize the security of the United States by relying upon promises which cannot, in all essentials, be controlled. However, there is some reason to believe that the Soviet Union itself would greatly welcome relief from the present burden of armament.

We have faith that man, who has been endowed with enough wit to devise the means of his self-destruction, also has enough wit to keep those means under effective control.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515, and Nov. 15, 1954, p. 719.

⁵ Mr. Stassen's testimony on Jan. 25 has been printed as part 1 of the subcommittee's hearing on control and reduction of armaments.

Visit of Italian President Gronchi

Following are texts of statements and addresses made during the visit to Washington of Giovanni Gronchi, President of Italy, from February 27 to March 2.

WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

Press release 97 dated February 27

Statement by Vice President Nixon

Mr. President, it is a very great honor to extend to you and to the members of your party a welcome to Washington, D.C., on the occasion of your visit to the United States and to welcome also the First Lady of Italy and the members of your party, the Foreign Minister and others that we have met before.

This is a particularly significant visit, we believe, not only because it is your first visit to the United States since you have assumed your high office, but because this is the first visit to our country of an Italian chief of state. And also because we feel it marks the end of one era and the beginning of another. This marks the completion of 10 years of democracy and progress for Italy since 1946, and it marks, we believe, the beginning of another great era of your leadership in the years ahead.

I can assure you that as you travel through our country you will find a warm welcome from the American people every place you go. It will be true not only because the sons and daughters of Italy have contributed so much to our culture and to our progress, but also because we Americans value the friendship which it has been our privilege to have between our two countries, our association in Nato, and our association now in the United Nations, in which Italy has now taken its rightful place.

And so, as I say, welcome again, and we wish you Godspeed in the days ahead, both here and at home.

Response by President Gronchi

Arriving in the United States, I wish first of all to say how grateful I am to President Eisenhower for having expressed with so much cordiality his desire that the head of the Italian state for the first time since the unification of Italy should visit as a guest your great country. The relations of sincere friendship existing between the United States and Italy for many years have now been strengthened by well-defined bonds of alliance for the defense of freedom and democracy. The Italians feel for the North American people much sympathy and admiration: two sentiments which go very rarely together, and which our common ideals and our common purposes are making ever more spontaneous and profound.

As the head of the Italian state, I am bringing to your country the most heartfelt expression of these sentiments, which I am sure will continue to govern relations between the United States and Italy.

The large flow of Italians to the United States since the time the prodigious progress of your country was in the making has shown how natural is cooperation between our two peoples and how constructive it can be in every field.

We intend not only to deepen and to extend such cooperation to our mutual advantage but to place it at the service of peace, of freedom, and of social and human progress. These are the immutable foundations of civilization that the United States and Italy have undertaken to defend.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS

Statement Released February 28

The President of the United States and the President of the Republic of Italy had a cordial and interesting exchange of views on various subjects. Particularly they discussed participation of both countries in the North Atlantic Treaty

March 12, 1956

377877-56-8

Organization. Both expressed their full and unqualified support of NATO and explored means of strengthening the solidarity of that organization and its members in the political, economic and psychological fields as well as in the military field.

The President of the Italian Republic emphasized again his firm support of European unification.

The President of the United States expressed his appreciation to the President of the Italian Republic for the Italian nation's unswerving devotion to the cause of liberty and individual freedom. The President also praised the important role Italy has always played as a charter member of NATO.

If further official meetings prove to be desirable, both Presidents agreed that they should be held.

News Conference Statement by President Eisenhower, February 29

... I would like to say ... how gratified I am that President Gronchi and his wife have come over to visit this Nation so early in his administration. It is evidence of his great concern in the Western alliance and in the organization of free nations.

It is the first time that the head of an Italian state has visited us, and I think that it should be especially gratifying to the many millions of our citizens of Italian extraction.

Certainly to me, both officially and personally, it is a source of gratification, and I am certain that wherever they go, and they are going to be in the North American Continent about 2 weeks, I hope that wherever they go they will experience that same kind of warm welcome and gain the feeling that we really respect this great member of the Western alliance.

Statement Released March 1

The President of the United States and the President of the Italian Republic met again today to complete their discussion of problems of mutual interest. They reaffirmed their intention to direct their action toward the preservation of peace, freedom and democracy. They reaffirmed that, while all possible efforts will continue to be made to achieve a reduction of armaments, the present situation does not allow any relaxation of the Western defense efforts. Concurrently, the President of the United States and the President of the Italian Republic agreed on the necessity of further

deepening and extending the solidarity among the members of the North Atlantic Community through increased cooperation among them in all fields.

The two recognized that to the extent that it is possible to improve the Western world economy and to facilitate the development of the less advanced economies within it, the Atlantic Community and indeed the entire free world will benefit. In particular, as far as Italy is concerned, they agreed that Italy no longer needs grant economic aid. The area that President Eisenhower and President Gronchi agreed should be increasingly explored, within the framework of established Western economic cooperation, is the possibility that, in addition to her own efforts, Italy could meet some of her problems by the extension of sound public and private, long-term foreign investments. The problem facing Italy, it was agreed, is the improvement of the conditions which are necessary to her industrial development, particularly in the south, and further to attract private, national and foreign investments.

PRESENTATION OF STATUE

At a ceremony in the White House Rose Garden on February 28, President Gronchi presented a reproduction of the Discus-Thrower to President Eisenhower. Following are President Gronchi's remarks, as interpreted, together with President Eisenhower's reply.

President Gronchi: Mr. President, it is an honor for me to present to you on behalf of the Italian people this statue which reproduces one of the most famous masterpieces of the antiquity. This presentation has the purpose of expressing our gratitude to the people of the United States for the restitution of the works of art which were removed from Italy during World War II.

This restitution has been made possible by the understanding and the interest of the United States and has been an accomplishment of inestimable significance for the restoration of the Italian artistic wealth in its integrity.

Probably not everybody is aware of the importance of such restitutions. They included the treasures of the National Museum of Naples, which contained the celebrated paintings of the Farnese collection and the superb collection of ancient gold works of Herculaneum and Pompei; the treasures

of the Uffizi and Pitti's Galleries, of the churches and convents of Tuscany, together with numerous privately owned works which still are, in Italy, a living part of its history since they often still belong to descendants of families which commissioned them directly from the great masters of the Renaissance.

These works were returned to Italy thanks to the efforts of men motivated by a sense of right as well as by love of culture, who had been entrusted by the American Government with the difficult and delicate task of such restitution and who, in the performance of their tasks, gave constant evidence both of their great love for Italy and of their deep respect for the most sacred principles of law and international life. Among those who exerted themselves the most in this task, collaborating with the Chief of the Italian Restitution Mission, Rodolfo Siviero, I wish to mention Gen. Lucius Clay, Mr. Robert Murphy, and Mr. Richard Howard. The German Federal Government itself cooperated in a cordial and friendly spirit in that noble task.

Mr. President, in renewing to you an expression of the deep appreciation of the Italian people, I wish to add that I am particularly pleased at having been able to hand over this statue to you, for the American people, during my present journey in the United States which promises to bring a new reaffirmation of the strong ties and the deep friendship which unite our two nations.

President Eisenhower: Mr. President, I am particularly happy to act as the agent of the American people in receiving from your hands, on behalf of the Italian people, this replica of the art of antiquity, together with objects which you did not mention—the column and the beautiful capital on top of it that I see just outside the enclosure.

I assure you that all America will be extremely gratified by your action, not only because of their interest in ancient arts, and in modern art, but because of their understanding that this gift comes from the affection and the sense of relationship on the part of the Italian people to our own. As you know, we have many millions of citizens of Italian derivation. They will be, I think, extremely proud that you brought this gift to our people, and all the rest of us will take a tremendous satisfaction that it has been handed over in the hands of one who is a militant leader for democracy and human values in this world of today.

Thank you very much.

ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 29¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, honorable Members of Congress, I am very grateful for your cordial welcome and I thank you for the opportunity you have given to me of extending here to the American people, to Congress, and to the United States Government the message of greetings and good wishes from the Italian people which I have already conveyed to President Eisenhower.

This message is an expression of the deep friendship which exists between our two peoples, and which has its roots, over and beyond all treaties and diplomatic agreements, in the bonds of a common civilization and of common democratic ideals, and in the kinship of a not inconsiderable segment of your great Nation for the large number of Italians who made their new home here.

My greeting is also a sincere expression of the gratitude of the Italian people for the striking proofs of solidarity which you gave us, at considerable sacrifice for all sections of your people, when, after the war, Italy had to rebuild from the ashes of a painful past her political, economic, and social life. This bond of gratitude cannot be forgotten, and my visit is meant as a reaffirmation of it.

Mutual Knowledge and Cooperation

But a friendship between two nations, as that between two persons, cannot be nurtured with sentiments and remembrances only. To keep it alive and vital, such friendship must draw nourishment from an intimate mutual knowledge and a steady cooperation of purpose and action.

Consequently, I shall attempt to focus your attention, albeit briefly, on the present position of Italy, her major problems, and on the evaluation that we in Italy make of current international developments. If I shall succeed in this task, the purpose of my visit will be, in my opinion, fully accomplished.

It should be recognized that, despite hopes and patient and generous endeavors, the world is not more secure today than it was 1 or 2 years ago. In fact, we are going through a disquieting phase of confusion in ideas and political orientations, and consequently of greater potential danger. It is sufficient in this context to look at North Africa

¹ Made in Italian before a joint session; interpreted by A. José DeSeabra of the Department of State; reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of Feb. 29, p. 3154.

and the Middle East, and to listen perceptively to the rumblings which come from the remainder of Asia.

It is true that, it would appear, we have moved from a war, a cold war but still a war, to a more peaceful competition, which impinges strongly upon the specific interests of each people, such as the development of national independence and the adjustment of the social structure. By becoming tinged with these features, such competition encompasses wider horizons and acquires every day a deeper meaning. Two basic conceptions face each other throughout the greatest part of the world. Will it be the principle of government for the people, or of the people subject to the government? Will it be the Western brand of democracy—democracy through freedom—or the so-called people's democracy, that is Marxist-Leninist? The latter ideology, while organically repugnant to our own, also as a moral and social conception, has in itself a great power of expansion, since it has the appearance of a political and social system capable of bringing freedom from poverty and from their sense of inferiority to the underprivileged classes.

But this power of expansion must be viewed with alarm by people, such as us, of different traditions and background, and make coexistence difficult since that ideology is embodied in a watertight political and economic system, and consequently sustained by all the powers of a government, which include not only the weapons of propaganda and of the media of mass communication, but also more powerful and frightful weapons, conventional and nuclear.

History knows only one example of peaceful ideological expansion, the expansion of Christianity against the pagan world. It was a peaceful one since it taught to men not to kill but to die for their faith.

The North Atlantic Treaty

Against this ferment which is spreading among the people of all continents, we can safeguard our ancient civilization only through an effort that will unfold and display its fuller meaning. We have to make our democratic system more and more capable of accomplishing an effective reconciliation between the authority of the state and individual freedom. We have to reinforce the solidarity of the people who share those ideals and

are striving to fulfill their ends. This solidarity exists, since the day of the signature of the Atlantic Pact among many Western nations, including the United States and Canada.

The Atlantic Pact, as conceived and operated thus far, was appropriate and sufficient so long as there was the fear of imminent armed aggression, intensified by an imbalance of strength between the two sides. It is a historical truth that the pact removed that danger and created the possibility of experimenting with attempts at solutions very different from those of the past. However, it should be brought into line with today's realities, when the military imbalance has been reduced and there have been so many changes of situation in many parts of the world.

Military cooperation continues to be very important today, but it should be supplemented with new and imaginative forms of cooperation. This is necessary not only to move away from a climate of emergency measures and to enter into a phase characterized by more complex and permanent arrangements, but chiefly because we all realize that no person, nation, or group of nations can consider without anxiety and anguish the prospects of a world where peace is based solely on military strength or on limited political alignments. Today especially when nuclear weapons have reached such fearful developments, which will be intensified in the future, it is essential that while an efficient military strength is maintained, every effort be made to reduce the danger of war, so that gradually the employment of force may be no longer required.

It has been said authoritatively, and truthfully, that even an adequate collective defense system does not constitute a final solution, but can only serve as a stage to go beyond the dangers of a balance-of-power approach, and to give a better foundation to peace.

In this brief survey which is made possible by my address to you, I do not wish to outline or discuss specific proposals. It would not be my task, anyhow.

One might consider a better coordination of the existing organizations—Organization for European Economic Cooperation, European Coal and Steel Community, Western European Union, the Council of Europe—because the new methods of a more organic cooperation should range from the political to the social and economic areas.

One might consider with more attention a better integrated functioning of NATO, involving a wider and more frequent use of the [North] Atlantic Council.

In this way we would accomplish the purpose of making more fruitful and timely the exchanges of views between the various members, giving to them a fuller sense of responsibility and at the same time a recognition of the value of their contribution to the common cause.

Within the framework of the NATO pact one might consider, dispassionately, the possibility of bringing at last life into the spirit of article 2, which right from the beginning was meant to give to the military pact the wider and deeper connotation of a community of peoples.

I cannot fail in my duty of emphasizing that the reorganization of the Western World is the central problem of the day, which should be faced without delay.

It is clear that the solution of these problems is not only an American responsibility.

The European nations of Strasbourg must contribute their share, by setting into motion the process of integration.

Our old and restless Europe must find the way to her spiritual and political unity and must pool together her resources if she wants to take up again her mission of civilization, which is true to her traditions and her history.

The United Nations, with their great organization, ought to give a more effective, continuous, impartial, and harmonious content to their task, which is charged with so great political and human significance.

I am convinced that in the new competition of ideologies and economic assistance we cannot hope for the success of our democratic conception unless this gives concrete and factual evidence of its superiority by bringing to bear the willpower and the means which, through appropriate action, can remove injustice and positions of inferiority within each national structure and internationally.

Italian Contribution

Italy wants to participate—within the limitations set by her resources and to the full extent of her commitments—to this work of redemption.

Italy has already contributed with full loyalty to the common cause. Italy asks that her contribution should not be appraised only with reference

to her participation in the Atlantic Pact and to the financial effort accomplished, with the friendly help of the American administration and Congress, in order to discharge faithfully the commitments deriving from NATO.

I know that our financial effort has appeared to some observers as insufficient or lukewarm, or imperfectly planned at the technical level.

Permit me, however, to point out that in this subject one relies too frequently on hasty reactions. Actually there is little justification for some of the comments which are made occasionally and which would seem to throw an adverse light upon our determination to maintain our armed forces at the highest level of strength and efficiency consistent with our resources. For instance, there is little meaning in a mere comparison of the percentages of gross national income allocated to defense in the various countries: 11 percent in the United States, 10 percent in the United Kingdom, 8 percent in France, against 5 percent in Italy.

Such comparison does not take into account the differences in total and per capita national income in each country, and actually distorts the facts, as it can be seen when one considers that the income of an American family, in real, actual terms, represents the income of 5 or perhaps 6 Italian families. Because of their low level of income, our people have to cut deeply into their resources, foregoing essential needs, in order to bear the financial burden of defense.

But the most significant and substantive Italian contribution to the common cause is that of having strengthened its internal structure, having restored democratic institutions and, with them, the authority of the state, having overcome the disruptive economic and social effects that are typical of all postwar periods, having increased all-round production, and having improved the living conditions of the working classes, especially in southern Italy. Owing to the depressed conditions of many areas of the Italian economy, this effort has been, as it had to be, much more considerable than the one accomplished in order to strengthen our defensive military posture within NATO. Your administration and you, gentlemen of the Congress, have given us invaluable help in this reconstruction, with wisdom, imagination, and great generosity, despite the great sacrifices entailed for the American taxpayer. No one in Italy will ever

forget this solidarity, which we appreciated also for its idealistic significance.

I know that from certain quarters there has been some criticism because of alleged waste or faulty utilization of the aid received. There may have been mistakes. But is there any responsible person in this country, so imbued with practical sense and experience, who can say that there is anywhere in the world a government or agency whose management is free from error?

In the overall picture of a national economy the important thing is not whether an individual item of accounting closes in the black or in the red, but whether the whole operation closes with a surplus or a deficit.

The 10-year period which has just ended for the Italian economy closed with a large plus balance. Consequently this Congress can tell the American people with satisfaction that the aid given to Italy was not an unproductive expenditure.

It is not my intention to bother you with figures; yet a few of them may be quoted to substantiate my statements.

(a) Industrial production increased five times since 1945, while agricultural production doubled.

(b) Per capita income and consumption increased by more than 50 percent with respect to 1947.

(c) The productive capacity of Italian industry doubled since 1947. Defense production is now very close to the levels required by NATO.

Therefore my country has made great strides, and if one looks back this is not to indulge in pride and self-satisfaction for what has been accomplished but to survey the long road which is still ahead of us, and what remains to be accomplished.

Problems Yet To Be Solved

All of us in Italy, government, the major parties and all responsible persons know, as you know, that we have still a large pool of chronic unemployment, as it transpires from the statistics. We know that much has been done for southern Italy but that there is still an unfair and excessive gap in individual income between north and south. We know that we must complete the land reform undertaken with notable success, and which has also a function of moral, social, and consequently political rehabilitation.

We are aware of the fact that our housing problem, while of varying dimensions in different

regions and cities, is still serious, also because of its human and political implications.

I am not telling you this to ask your help or to suggest that you continue a policy of aid which we consider rightly closed by you.

Italy can be compared to a working concern, well under way, which, however, has inadequate capital resources, falling short of what would be required to expand its physical plant and to improve its organization and its equipment.

Consequently, Italy does not hope and does not ask sacrifices from others and free advantages for her. On the contrary, she is anxious to be considered in the same light as a customer of good moral and financial standing who gets in touch with a bank, applying for loans at favorable terms, or approaching a financial institution in order to enlist its interest in profitable and secure joint ventures or other participations. In many countries and probably also in yours, there are people who have a conventional picture of the Italian economy, based on stereotypes such as the hopeless lack of natural resources, the inability of the Government to collect taxes from its citizens and to manage its financial affairs competently, the alleged deficiencies of its vocational education. This picture is either inaccurate or obsolete. This may be due to the fact that many people, well meaning and well disposed, but with only a few days on their hands, are attempting to do in 2 or 3 days what, even for the study of a single firm or plant, would require weeks of work by an expert American auditor interested in scratching below the surface of things.

Our natural resources are growing. The discovery of large amounts of natural gas has permitted extensive practical applications to industry and science. Pretty soon oil will become one of our most important productive resources.

Taxes absorb a very high percentage of our national income, especially if one considers that the average income is very low.

Vocational schools, which are being expanded and better organized, are increasing and improving the productivity of our labor. You can draw yourselves a picture of this change by comparing the skills of earlier Italian immigrants with those of the more recent ones, who are better qualified and prepared.

In conclusion we have in Italy the essential prerequisites for a steady and balanced development of our economy. The program outlined by the late

lamented Minister Ezio Vanoni aimed at that purpose, and it remains valid also today, with some corrections suggested by experience. Italy's great need is that, through mutual agreements at the international level, closer economic cooperation be removed from the stratosphere of science and high principles, and brought down to earth.

Economic cooperation, in an age like ours, is not a burden or a mere act of generosity from one country to another. It is policy consonant with the interest of each and all concerned.

A poor country or a country beset with difficulties and uncertainties is a danger to all others, on both counts, that is, domestic weakness and inability to protect itself against external dangers. I can say that no people, even the richest in resources and creative power, can be durably prosperous if there are many nations which are unhappy and restless because of the hardships of poverty and starvation, of the burden of injustice, and because of the uncertainty of their immediate future.

The wonderful development of the United States, at which the world looks with admiration and astonishment, has become even greater since this country discarded its isolationist state of mind. From that point on, you have placed yourselves in the very heart of world events, and have become the determining factor of world history.

It is therefore in the name of a mutual interest that I appeal here to you for closer and uninterrupted cooperation, carried on in a spirit of mutual trust and faith.

Need for Faith

Faith is the basic element which I would like to mention in closing these words of mine. Without faith, there could be no meetings of the mind and no true cooperation.

Italy can be trusted, because of the capacity and willingness to work of her managers, technicians, and labor, and also because of her faithfulness to democratic ideals and firm determination to defend and expand their accomplishments.

Our destiny as individuals, in our family, social, or political life, is safe and free only in a democracy which draws its principles from the Christian tradition.

After the historical experiences of Eastern Europe, what would be our anxiety if this type of democracy should disappear or even should yield

to some degree. We all are firmly convinced of this fact, and I am the first to believe it.

In spite of uncertainties which are natural, given also certain dispositions of a Latin people, democratic stability in Italy is not in danger, and the democratic political parties together with the great majority of public opinion are fully conscious of their responsibility for maintaining and strengthening the institutions which the Italian people freely accepted through their constitution.

My people know that freedom becomes a sham and a privilege for those who are already strong, unless it means to every man and woman freedom from the hardships of poverty and starvation.

My people want to succeed, through an action based on progress and justice, in bringing about a friendly disposition toward the authority of the state on the part of certain large segments of our people who are still diffident or hostile to it. In this way the authority of the state will be strengthened through the self-discipline of the people.

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, gentlemen of the Congress, this is the Italy which today is before you, as a member in good standing of the great family of the Western democracies.

ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, MARCH 1²

I am very happy of the opportunity afforded to me by your National Press Club of meeting with you gentlemen of the press. This is the more so, since because of your professional skill and tradition for objectivity you gentlemen are a most effective channel for clarifying and welding together in a single constructive effort the hopes and purposes of the free world.

Only a month ago, for the first time since the end of the war, there was once more, from the Capital of this great Nation and as a result of the meeting between the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister, a restatement of the very principles dear to most people which helped to win the dreadful ordeal of the last war and enabled many nations oppressed by dictatorship to live once more in freedom and democracy.³ The restatement of those principles

² Delivered in Italian.

³ BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.

after 10 years acquires a fresh significance because, now that their wartime appeal has faded out, it brings to the foreground the problem of how we shall go about in spreading those principles and defending them, so that the greatest part of human society may identify itself with their intent and may cooperate in their fulfillment and preservation.

As I mentioned before the joint session of Congress which I had the honor of addressing yesterday, two fundamental conceptions of life are facing each other throughout the world, with far-reaching implications on the organization and the orientation of modern nations. This, in my opinion, is the basic new fact that we must consider, a fact which is pregnant with developments going far beyond the area of such problems as military defense and the balance of power.

The fact is that we might witness a process of political conquest, through the conquest of the mind and of the heart of people, without the need for a single gun being fired. There is already some such symptom, especially in Asia, and it is not an overstatement to say that, together with the terrifying developments of nuclear weapons, the awakening of the feeling of independence and the hopes for freedom which are multiplying, from North Africa to Indonesia, are foreshadowing the entrance of new nations as free and influential factors in world history, as well as new situations and the new configurations in the balance of world power.

Weapons of Self-Defense

The type of democracy in which we believe, that is, the one which places itself at the service of the individual to help him to express his full personality and to enhance human dignity, calls for additional weapons of self-defense. It was a great step forward to have reached the point when war is less probable in the near future than it was in the past. We must be glad of this development, because nowadays war would be equivalent to total destruction. However, this in itself is not a sufficient safeguard for that spiritual Christian conception and for those political and social systems which are identified with our faith in freedom and justice—in turn, the only forces which can free humanity from slavery in every shape or form.

This, I suggest, is the big problem which we have now to face. It does not eliminate the last-

ing need for a posture of armed defense, painful as this may be, nor the need for the cooperative, military, and political arrangements related to it. Every free country must be on its guard against the temptation of denying or even whittling down their importance. However, we can realize already now the inadequacies of the so-called balance of power, and with it the danger, inherent to the balance-of-power conception, of bringing about a vicious spiral of causes and effects, set into motion by mutual diffidence and fear and resulting in a dangerous and ruinous race for power.

These considerations are not original, and I do not claim any special gift of insight. I think however that it is useful to bring them to the attention of you gentlemen of the press who are responsible to such a great extent for the enlightenment of public opinion in our democratic countries. It may well be that these truths, which have been already voiced by statesmen of great standing, have a stronger appeal in the nations which are less wealthy and consequently are unable to compete with the wealthier ones in strength. It is a fact that to become prepared for war, with all those frightful modern weapons, is a tragic luxury far beyond the means of nations less endowed with wealth. However, it would be mistaken to think that such an attitude implies discouragement or weakness, stemming either from unreasonable fatalism or from irresponsible optimism.

People such as the Italians, who have felt in their own flesh the unmitigated horrors of war, have been warned through experience. They know that, if they want to preserve their independence, their security, and their free existence—in other words, if they want to survive—they must seek through mutual cooperation with other nations the strength which they cannot have alone. Consequently, we are faithful to our alliances because we are convinced that they are consonant with our fundamental interests. This is the position of Italy, and we have done and are doing all that is necessary to fulfill our commitments, regardless of sacrifices.

Above all, Italy and other like-minded nations are appealing to their friends so that the Western World may become a close community, and that cooperation within that community may help to solve problems of survival and development of the less strong units, and may also help to free other nations from the enslavement to injustice and poverty.

The problem is to demonstrate in fact, and in a practical way, the superiority of our democratic principles of progress and civilization, in the face of the solutions advocated by the Marxist and the totalitarian ideology.

I am talking about this to you because, as a Christian and as a believer in democracy, I am eager to bring nearer the attainment of a just, durable, and secure peace, capable of safeguarding all human rights. I talk of this because it seems to me essential that this eagerness be shared by all of us, particularly among the leaders of opinion of the free world. For ultimately the great issues of collective interest are not settled through official agreements and diplomatic arrangements but only as a result of convictions which in turn awaken our sense of responsibility.

Two-Fold Action in Italy

As far as Italy is concerned, we have developed a two-fold action: a domestic action for the defense of our free institutions, and an international action having as its objective a clarification of our requirements and a fresh appraisal of our potentialities, within the framework of the existing alliances.

Our domestic action is based upon the assumption of the full implementation of the clauses and principles of our Constitution, accepted by the free will of our people, which has entrusted their application and defense to our constitutional authorities. This is supplemented, however, by a conscious and far-reaching action, having as its objective an improvement in the conditions of the poorer segments of our population. In Europe an attitude of a mere conservatism would be inevitably left behind by the pressures of our social realities, which make themselves felt not only when the overall economic situation deteriorates but also and even more, as it is the case with Italy, when a better economic situation brings about new requirements and enables new and wider segments of the population to enter the market as consumers.

The post-war Italian governments have endeavored with success to restore the technical efficiency of the public administration, which had been disrupted by dictatorship and war. They have also endeavored even more, and will continue to do so, to eradicate to the greatest possible extent the factors which may lead to disturbance of social peace. The results of this conscious effort are

already apparent. We Italians have traveled a long road toward reconstruction and much has been done to change the economic fabric of the country, to cut down vigorously and, possibly, to wipe out the gaps existing between different classes and different regions. As an example I might quote our land reform, and as another the work of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno. A long-range development plan for the elimination of unemployment, along the lines first conceived by the lamented Minister of the Budget, Ezio Vanoni, is now under active consideration. It will help to give specific shape and continuity to our programs for the future.

During a first phase of this effort for the improvement of living conditions in Italy, we have benefited from the friendly assistance of the United States of America. I wish to repeat also to you gentlemen that this cooperation has created strong, secure, and lasting bonds between the Italian and the American people.

But even in your country there are people who entertain doubts as to the wisdom and effectiveness of our principles and methods of political and social life. I do not wish to disregard this fact, while of course, because of the responsibilities inherent to my office, it would not be proper for me to engage in political or other controversies.

Let me say, however, first of all, and this not because of pride or insufferance of criticism, that it might be prudent to recall an old saying which has been quoted in the past few days by an authoritative newspaperman. The saying goes, "A fool in his home knows more than a wise man abroad." I would like to add in this context that Italy has leaders, democratic parties, Parliament, and a Government which are perfectly conscious of their responsibilities for the defense of freedom and democracy. In every democratic country, and consequently also in Italy, political stability can be secured chiefly by enlisting the confidence in and allegiance to the state on the part of the largest number of the population. Outside of this method there are only the authoritarian practices of more or less disguised dictatorships, which are repellent to you and to us because they deny the fundamental freedoms of man. It would be damaging to attempt to enlist that allegiance through spurious compromises at the expense of our principles. No lover of democracy in Italy can be suspected of that. What we want is to give to the authority of the state the noble imprint of justice

and to free the less privileged classes from the pressures of poverty through a more equitable distribution of our national income. This is the ground on which we envisage the reconciliation of the Italian people with the authority of the state, which is our dream and the idea for which we work.

Therefore Italy deserves confidence, full confidence in the light of her democratic traditions and of the sense of responsibility of her leaders.

In the international sphere Italy is motivated by a sense of active responsibility which translates itself in an ever-increasing degree of participation in the negotiations for the solution of common problems. Italy cannot overlook in particular the pressures which are developing above all in the Near and Middle East, that is, in an area which has always been an outpost of her defense. It is essential that the stabilizing function of Italy in that area be considered in our efforts for common defense, lest the existing equilibrium become dangerously shaken and the cooperation which exists with the countries of the Mediterranean region become seriously jeopardized.

We are convinced that the energies of all members of the Atlantic community, reappraised and coordinated in a program of active common action, will give us the domestic and external security which will answer the earnest expectations of our peoples.

This reference to the necessity for a degree of political and economic evolution in the association of the free nations is not meant as a negative criticism of the present organizational arrangements of the West. It is meant with reference to the future and to the necessity of taking into due consideration the position of each member, to prevent friction or dispersions of energy, and to strengthen the weak points which might appear from time to time.

These are the thoughts which I wanted to express in this place, before you who, as representatives of a press of outstanding liberal and democratic traditions, are especially sensitive to problems of relationship between the two big forces which are aligned in the defense of freedom, namely the United States and Western Europe.

I could not conclude, however, without saying that this frank discussion of problems in an atmosphere of sincere cooperation, and among equals, which are typical features of the relations among the nations of the free world, and of which my

own visit to the United States is a symbol, are already by themselves a tangible evidence of the harmony which exists among us, and of our determination to make our cooperation ever more intimate and consequently more effective, in the service of peace and of human progress, which are our loftiest common aims.

U.S. Restates Position on Weather Balloons

TEXT OF NOTE TO U. S. S. R.¹

Press release 109 dated March 1

The United States Government acknowledges receipt of the Soviet Government's further note of February 18 objecting to the flight of meteorological balloons by the United States and proposing an exhibit of the material in the Soviet Government's possession.

The facts in this matter were conveyed to the Soviet Government in the United States Government's note of February 8.² With that note was enclosed a copy of the press release issued in Washington January 8 describing the project in detail at the time of its initiation. The United States Government observes that the Soviet Government deliberately withheld publication in its own press of the information material in that release which it erroneously referred to merely as a United States domestic regulation.

As previously stated, free-floating United States balloons have long been employed for the advancement of meteorological study. The Soviet allegations concerning the danger of such balloons to aerial navigation are as misleading as Soviet assertions concerning the purpose of the project. Thousands of meteorological balloons have been launched in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres without interference with air traffic or danger to lives and property on the ground. The Soviet Government and certain Eastern European Governments have been the only nations to object. It is noted that the Soviet Government has not taken advantage of the offer put forth in the United States Government's note of February 8 to discuss with the United States authorities the

¹ Delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Mar. 1.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 293.

nature of the safety devices incorporated in these balloons.

At the time that the Soviet Government objected to the transit of United States meteorological balloons over the U. S. S. R., its own balloons were passing over and landing on the territory of other countries. It is noteworthy that Soviet balloons have flown over United States territory and that authenticated reports have been received of the recovery of Soviet balloons on the territory of several countries including Japan, Turkey, Iran, Finland, and Germany. It is illogical that the Soviet Government should desire one rule for itself and another for the rest of the world.

The Soviet Government has not returned the scientific property which rightfully belongs to the United States and which the Soviet Government has endeavored to convert to propaganda uses of its own. In renewing its request for the return of the equipment in question, the United States Government states its willingness to return the Soviet equipment which has come into its possession.

It is the firm belief of the United States Government that any legitimate concern of the Soviet Government regarding the United States balloon operation has been satisfied by the United States Government's decision conveyed in its note of February 8, provisionally to suspend the release of balloons which could transit Soviet territory. Thus in view of the cognizance taken by the United States Government of Soviet objections, there would appear to be no scientific or other reasonable purpose which would be served by exhibits of the nature proposed by the Soviet Government. The United States Government can only assume that pursuit of this matter through exhibits or other means would be for propaganda ends apparently intended to exacerbate the international atmosphere.

While perceiving no constructive purpose in the type of exhibit proposed by the Soviet Government, the United States Government, in order to promote progress in an area of interest to all Governments, is willing to work out internationally through cooperative arrangements with the Soviet Government and other interested Governments, a joint program for the utilization of techniques and equipment, including the type of balloons referred to in the Soviet note, which it has developed in meteorological research. It is the tentative view

of the United States Government that the facilities of the World Meteorological Organization might appropriately be utilized in giving effect to this proposal.

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE OF FEBRUARY 18

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the note of the United States Government of February 8, which is an answer to the note of the Soviet Government of February 4 concerning the question of the release of American balloons in the air space of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

In its note of February 4 the Soviet Government directed the attention of the United States Government to the fact that a great quantity of American balloons with apparatus suspended from them, which included automatic operating cameras for aerial photography of terrain, radio transmitters, radio receivers, and other things, had been captured in the Soviet Union. By this note the Soviet Government demanded that the United States take measures to cease release of such balloons in the air space of the Soviet Union.

In its answering note the United States Government does not deny that American balloons were released in the air space of the Soviet Union. But, at the same time, an argument not justifying the violation of air space is advanced, namely that flights of air balloons are not dangerous for aerial communications.

In view of this, the Soviet Government again points out that the release of such balloons in the air space of the U.S.S.R. is a gross violation of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union and generally accepted norms of international law, and lodges its protest against it.

In addition, numerous data at the disposition of the Soviet Government and also statements by the governments of a number of other European countries in this regard bear witness to the fact that flights of American balloons are a serious threat both for air transport and for the population of the districts above which these balloons fly. It is clear to all that a collision of an airplane with a balloon bearing a cargo weighing up to 650 kilograms threatens unavoidable catastrophe. It is obvious also that two boxes, suspended to a large metal beam, with ballast with overall weights of 200 to 300 kilograms freely falling from great height due to so-called automatic destruction of balloon, can damage buildings, telephones, electricity wires, and various equipment, and cause human injuries. From the facts set forth, it follows that the statement of the United States Government to the effect that American balloons released in the air space of the U.S.S.R. are no danger to air transport contradicts accurately established factual data relating to balloons and their equipment.

In the note of the United States Government there is also included a further assertion to the effect that balloons outfitted with the apparatus indicated above in general are intended only for meteorological research. An examination of the equipment suspended to air balloons

carried out by Soviet experts shows that the release of these balloons in the air space of the U.S.S.R. has nothing in common with meteorological research but pursues a completely different aim. Suffice it to say that not one of the numerous balloons captured in the Soviet Union has any kind of apparatus intended for measurement of basic meteorological elements—atmospheric pressure, temperature, humidity of air, and others.

Film with pictures of the territory of the Soviet Union revealed in the cameras of balloons caught in the U.S.S.R. bears witness to the fact that the real purpose of these balloons sent into the air space of the Soviet Union by American military organs is aerial photography of the territory of the Soviet Union.

Representatives of the foreign press and diplomatic corps in Moscow had an opportunity personally to convince themselves of this by examining the equipment of the American balloons which were displayed at a special exhibition in Moscow.

Inasmuch as in the note of the United States Government there is expressed a point of view differing from the conclusions based on indisputable data in the possession of the Soviet authorities, the Government of the U.S.S.R. proposes to organize in New York, Washington, London, or Paris, if agreement to this will be forthcoming from the governments of the states in question, exhibitions of the air balloons and apparatus suspended from them captured in the U.S.S.R. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union has at its disposal a large quantity of captured air balloons, the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to organize similar exhibits also in other countries, in the event of the agreement of the governments of these states, if there is need to be convinced of the soundness of the assertions made by the Soviet Government.

If the United States Government considers this proposal acceptable, the Soviet Government is ready to send to these exhibits Soviet experts who could give the necessary explanations concerning the equipment displayed and furnish other information concerning the flight of these balloons over the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government considers familiarization by specialists and public opinion with exhibitions of this type will make it possible for them to be clearly convinced as to the purpose for which these air balloons captured in the U.S.S.R. were intended and whether or not they constitute a danger for air transport and population.

The Soviet Government takes note of the declaration of the United States Government that it will for its part take the necessary measures to prevent the further release of air balloons which might fly over the territory of the U.S.S.R.

Balloon Flights in Eastern Europe

U.S./U.N. press release 2353 dated February 10

The following communication was transmitted on February 11 to the Secretary-General by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

I have the honor to refer to communications addressed to the Secretary-General by the governments of several states in Eastern Europe¹ concerning reported flights of balloons over their territories.

These communications resemble a note previously received by the U.S. Government from the Soviet Union. All of them are based on a misconstruction of facts. The U.S. Government on February 8 explained its position and set forth the true facts in this matter in a reply to the Soviet Union which has been made public.

Therefore, and in view of the relationship between the actions taken by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the aforementioned countries of Eastern Europe, further statements by the Government of the United States do not appear to be required at this time.

I request that this letter be circulated to all states members of the United Nations.

Color Television Demonstrations for Foreign Visitors

Press release 103 dated February 29

A program of color television demonstrations, organized jointly by Government and industry for the benefit of visiting engineers from abroad, will open in New York City on March 5, 1956.

This event has been arranged at the request of representatives of countries holding membership in the television study group of the International Radio Consultative Committee of the International Telecommunication Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations with headquarters at Geneva. The purpose of the demonstrations is to afford radio and television engineers from other countries an opportunity to collect information on different color systems being studied or in service in countries which have made the greatest technological advances, to facilitate the development of systems in their own countries. Similar demonstrations for the same group of engineers will be staged at Paris, London, and The Hague immediately following the U.S. demonstrations.

The Department of State, which is primarily responsible for this Government's participation in

¹ Albania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. The text of the Bulgarian communication was released by the United Nations on Feb. 9.

the International Telecommunication Union, has secured the cooperation of industry's top executives and outstanding television and electronics engineers in arranging a full program of demonstrations, lectures, and discussion for the approximately 100 experts expected to attend from about 20 countries. The Federal Communications Commission and the U.N. Secretariat are also lending their support to the occasion.

U.S. Trade Policy and Problems

by Robert D. Coe
*Ambassador to Denmark*¹

I know very few countries which are so trade-minded as Denmark. I have traveled now in Seeland and Fyn and Jutland—and on several of your smaller islands. In every town I have visited I have discovered that employers and employees alike, in industry, agriculture, and commerce, are keenly interested in world trade and very well informed about world trade developments. I have also discovered that, when you Danes think of trade, you think in terms of expanding trade, of lowering trade barriers, of buying as well as selling. You believe that the ship which sails into Aarhus Bay loaded with a foreign cargo can be just as profitable to you as the ship which sails away, carrying good Danish hams—and, of course, blue cheese.

I have felt very much at home in this atmosphere. My own country, in the last three decades, has become one of the world's great trading nations. In that time we have also become firmly committed to the belief that trade is most profitable when it flows freely—in both directions.

The production of the free world's goods and services has shown a remarkable expansion in the past 5 years. In the same period there has been made great progress in raising the level of trade and lowering the barriers to trade. We believe that free-world production will continue to rise—that each year more and better goods and services

will be produced. We believe that the free nations can best share in this increased production—and contribute to further increases—if these goods and services can be traded as freely as possible. Those beliefs are at the basis of our trade policy.

I have no doubt you remember the Marshall plan, which the United States sponsored in the postwar period. It has been mentioned many times and I shall not name it again, but that plan was an effort by the United States to assist in expanding free-world production. We helped to rebuild industries, to restore transportation and power facilities. We sent American technicians abroad. We invited foreign technicians to visit the United States. Were we foolish to do all this—to help raise production in other countries?

After all, Denmark and the other nations of the world are our competitors. You compete with us in world markets. We believe that we were not foolish. We believe that in an expanding world economy there is room for all of us, that, as each nation prospers and increases its production and raises its purchasing power, we and the other nations of the free world will also prosper. We believe that competition in world markets is healthy.

Reducing Barriers to World Trade

We have done and are doing all we can to help create conditions of healthy competition in world markets. The United States is active in the

¹ Address delivered before the Provincial Chamber of Commerce at Aarhus, Denmark, on Feb. 1.

several international agencies and agreements which are working to reduce the barriers to world trade and to facilitate the multilateral flow of goods and capital. One of these is the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and at this moment Denmark and the United States and some 30 other nations are negotiating at Geneva, trying by mutual concessions further to eliminate trade barriers. In his 1956 economic message to the Congress President Eisenhower recommended early passage of legislation authorizing United States membership in the proposed new international agency—the Organization for Trade Cooperation.²

One of the most important trade barriers, of course, is a nation's tariff structure. Now, one's opinion about a tariff, as I learned last week from the Copenhagen papers, depends very much on one's point of view. It seems that any tariff is a bad thing if another country is putting it up against one's own country; on the other hand, it seems that a tariff may sometimes be a very good thing if one's own country is putting it up against other countries. Viewed from the point of view of world trade, however, a prohibitively high tariff is a bad thing. The United States recognizes this and, by its own direct actions and by multilateral negotiations, it has made great progress in lowering its own tariffs. We have been engaged in this progress for quite a few years.

It was in 1934 that the American Congress first enacted a Trade Agreements Act. In the 22 years since that act we have reduced by 50 percent the average rate on all our dutiable imports. We have steadily lowered duties until the average duty on all United States imports is now less than 6 percent. The United States has in fact become one of the low-tariff countries of the world. This statement may surprise many of you. I think it is not generally known that in this period the United States has actually cut its tariffs in half. These cuts, I may add, have not always been easy. We also have a textile industry, and we have thousands of other industries, and these industries sometimes objected strongly to tariff cuts. Our Congress persisted, however, and, in fact, has gone steadily on to make further tariff reductions possible.

There was enacted last year legislation authorizing the President to reduce tariff rates, by nego-

tiations, by 5 percent per year over a period of 3 years. We are negotiating these reductions at the GATT meeting now in progress at Geneva.

Simplifying Customs Procedures

The United States has also taken far-reaching steps of its own to open up the American market, to make it easier for our merchants to buy as well as sell. Complicated customs procedures can sometimes obstruct trade; and so we have taken steps to simplify and clarify our customs procedures, and we expect to go further in that direction. The amount of foreign goods which each American tourist can bring home free of duty has been increased from \$300 to \$500, and President Eisenhower has recommended that it be increased further to \$1,000. We have liberalized, in favor of foreign suppliers, the terms of the regulations which permit these foreign suppliers to bid on United States Government purchases and contracts. We have sought, under our offshore procurement program, to place in foreign countries orders for military equipment destined for the common defense. We have encouraged the flow of American private investment capital abroad.

Have these measures been effective? Have we in fact made it easier for you and other nations to sell to the United States? I think the trade figures themselves are the best answer. In 1955 merchandise exports into the United States are estimated at about \$11 billion. This is just under 80 billion kroner. It is nearly 10 percent more than our imports in 1954, and it is nearly 4 times the average of United States imports of the pre-war period.

We are buying more and, most important to you, we are buying more from Denmark. In 1955, Danish exports to the United States, including our armed forces in Europe, are estimated at 530 million kroner. This compares to 490 million in 1954, to 119 million in 1950, and to an annual average of only 17 million in the years 1935-38. These figures are not in terms of constant prices, but nevertheless you are now selling to the United States approximately 10 times as much as you sold before the war. The United States has now become Denmark's third best customer.

These are impressive figures. They are equally impressive evidence of the aims and the direction of American trade policy. I suspect, however, that at this point some of you may be thinking,

² BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 254.

"This is all very fine, but what about blue cheese, the fifty-fifty clause, the surplus butter sales?"

In my country we have a very popular form of pastry which is called a doughnut. It is a circular piece of pastry with a round hole in the middle. We often define a pessimist as a man who sees only the hole in the doughnut and not the doughnut itself. I believe you in Denmark define a pessimist as a man who sees only the holes in a cheese. In any case, speaking candidly, it sometimes seems to me that critics of American commercial policy ignore the great strides we have taken to break down trade barriers and concentrate instead upon the relatively few measures we have found it necessary to take to protect American industry, agriculture, and shipping. Such measures exist, of course. They exist in every country. But they are not typical. To concentrate upon them means missing the much more typical and positive aspects of our overall trade policy. It means seeing only the hole and not the doughnut—or the cheese.

Unfortunately, some of our measures do have, however, a special importance for Danish-American trade relations. I'd like, therefore, to be a pessimist myself for a few minutes; I'd like to ignore the doughnut and to examine closely one or two of the holes.

In any discussion of American trade policy, a few words and phrases constantly recur. One of the favorites is "escape clause," and it is usually mentioned along with Swiss watches and British bicycles. There sometimes exists much misinformation about this escape clause. It is a clause which permits the President, upon recommendation from the Tariff Commission, to restore the cuts made in certain tariffs if a domestic American industry can establish that, as a result of the lowered tariff, imports have increased to a point where they are causing serious injury to the industry. In other words, the escape clause operates only after tariff cuts have already been made. This clause has been on our statute books for 7 years. In that time, from all the thousands of industries in the United States there have been only about 60 applications for restoration of tariff cuts. The Tariff Commission has recommended restoration of tariff cuts in only 16 of these cases. The President has acted to restore the cuts in only 6 cases.

One of these cases was the famous bicycle case. In that case the United States tariff in question had been cut from 30 percent to 7½ percent. Im-

ports of bicycles rose from 2 percent of U.S. consumption in 1949 to over 58 percent in 1955. The domestic industry was seriously injured, and, upon recommendation from the Tariff Commission, the President restored a part, but only a part, of the tariff cut. He restored it to 11¼ percent on lightweight bicycles, which constituted the bulk of the imports. After the dust had settled it was realized that this new tariff of 11 percent is still a considerable drop from the earlier tariff of 30 percent and that it is one of the lowest bicycle tariffs maintained by a bicycle-producing country.

Taken all together, the commodities affected by this and the other escape-clause actions represented only a very small fraction of our trade, and yet they were given much publicity. Such cases are bound to happen again, and it is fair to expect foreign producers to protest again. When these cases occur, however, it ought to be remembered that they occur only because of the far more important fact that sizeable reductions in tariffs have occurred first. With that in mind you will appreciate that the escape clause is a necessary safety valve to prevent us going too far and too fast in any given tariff cut. Without such a safety valve it would be impossible for us to proceed with our general policy of tariff reduction.

Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses

One aspect of our trade policy which I know is of particular interest to you people of Aarhus concerns our program for the disposal of agricultural surpluses.

We have in the United States, as you know very well, great surpluses of certain agricultural products, including dairy products. These came about because of the tremendous and worldwide demand for food and fiber which existed in the war years and the years immediately following. The need was very great and, providentially, the United States was in a position to supply this need. We urged our farmers on, using all kinds of incentives, and we expanded our agricultural production greatly. Our ability to produce the food the world needed was a factor in the final victory, in limiting much of the postwar starvation, and in bolstering the free world in its painful task of reconstruction.

The result of this tremendous effort, however, has been that we now have production in excess of effective demand and we have surpluses. I

know and appreciate your anxieties about our dairy surpluses. I have discussed them with leaders of Danish agriculture on previous visits to Jutland. I was impressed then with the understanding which these men have of our problem.

What are we going to do with these surpluses? Well, one thing we are not going to do is to undermine world markets. In fact, it is exactly because of our refusal to throw these goods on the world market at cutthroat prices that our problem of disposal exists.

We are attacking the problem in several ways. We have introduced flexible price supports, reducing the incentive to the farmer so that he diverts his acreage to other uses. In a special message to Congress last month,³ President Eisenhower recommended a bold new plan under which an area of 16 million hectares would be retired from crop and livestock production and used in connection with soil conservation programs. This area is 6 times the area of all of Denmark's cultivated land. By such means as these we expect to hold down the accumulation of surpluses.

But what about the dairy surpluses already on hand? Our cheese surpluses are down from 436 million pounds to 250 million; our stocks of butter are now down from 466 million pounds to 45 millions; our dried skim milk stocks have gone from 600 million pounds to almost nothing. Much of these stocks were disposed of in the American market, but we have also disposed of considerable quantities in world markets. Throughout the period we have been doing so, the traditional exporters of dairy products have been enjoying capacity exports and, in fact, have frequently been unable to meet foreign demand. It seems fair to conclude that we have disposed of these surpluses without unduly disrupting world markets.

Where commercial sales have taken place in foreign markets, they have been made at competitive world prices. Following a recent sale of United States surplus butter to Germany, there were charges that we were undermining the Danish market in that country. I am informed that the wholesale price of this butter in the German market is now 5.90 to 6.00 D. marks per kilo as against 6.15 to 6.20 D. marks for Danish butter in the same market. This is a price difference of only 4½ percent. I believe that this can hardly be called unfair competition. I am also informed that the

demand in Germany which this butter is intended to satisfy is in part a newly arisen demand, a demand which has now appeared as a result of increases in the German standard of living. If this is the case, it seems inaccurate to suggest that the United States sale has forced traditional suppliers out of the German market. As a matter of fact, I am told by our Embassy in Bonn that, in spite of a slight delay, Germany expects to proceed with its planned butter purchases from traditional suppliers in the first quarter of 1956.

This German sale illustrates the principles which have guided our agricultural export policy. Our sales have been competitive, in price and in quality. Our sales have been made at a time or in a place where the circumstances were such that our sales would not cause loss of markets to traditional suppliers.

I appreciate that nevertheless you may have apprehensions. I assure you that we are ready always to talk facts in Copenhagen or in Washington. We will not engage in any cutthroat race for markets. We will not break or unduly disrupt markets. We are interested in fair play.

Import Quotas

We have in the United States import quotas on a few and only a few commodities. One of these is a Danish product well known to you, a product which I may have the pleasure of eating later tonight. In connection with this blue-cheese quota, I would like to point out a fact which is often overlooked, namely, that our price support program, which led to our surpluses and, in turn, to our import quotas, is also the very thing which has made the American market so attractive to exporters of these products. In other words, if we did not have the price supports which have made us establish the import quota on blue cheese and which keep American prices high, you might not have been impelled to enter the market. We have, in a very real sense, created the market. I would like to remind you, too, of a much more important fact. In spite of quotas, exports of all kinds of Danish cheese to the United States and our armed forces totaled 17.5 million kroner in 1955. This is the highest figure on record. It is a tribute to Danish export enterprise and an indication of American willingness to buy a fine product—without regard to its foreign origin.

You may recall the famous joke about the ele-

³ H. Doc. 285, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

phant. A German was asked to write about the elephant and he wrote a treatise about the philosophical importance of the elephant. A Frenchman wrote about the elephant's love life. The Britisher described an elephant hunt. I sometimes think, after almost 3 years in Denmark, that if I were asked to write about the elephant I would produce a paper entitled, "The Elephant and the 50-50 Shipping Clause."

I am sure you know that the 50-50 clause is a controversial subject in my own country and that certain groups there are very much interested in its repeal. Because of this controversy it would not be proper for me to comment upon the merits of the clause. The clause should be seen, however, in a much larger context.

I know how important shipping is to Denmark, and I know how fine your ships are. I came here last night on one of them. I also know that you do not subsidize your merchant marine. If we are to have a merchant marine, however, it is necessary for us, because of our high labor and other costs, to subsidize it heavily. In the light of the experience of the last war, we consider a moderate merchant marine absolutely essential to our defense. We consider also that it is absolutely essential to the defense of our friends in the free world.

Our subsidies are aimed at maintaining this moderate merchant marine. We are not expanding it. On the contrary, we have laid away many ships in costly "mothballs," as we call them, again for the defense of the free world. All this costs the American taxpayer a great deal of money, and the 50-50 clause was devised by the Congress as a kind of subsidy which was considered to be least burdensome to the American taxpayer. The clause applied at first only to those shipments made as part of United States direct aid programs—and only to 50 percent of those. Surely this was not unreasonable. It has since been extended, but it still applies only to 50 percent of those shipments which, in one way or another, are sponsored or financed by the Government. The clause has no application to normal commercial shipments and, despite its existence, the percentage of total United States foreign trade which is carried in foreign ships continues to rise. I am informed that this percentage is now up to 75 percent.

I would like to go on speaking frankly. I haven't even mentioned some things, such as the import licensing and exchange control systems, which many countries, including Denmark, main-

tain. To do that, perhaps, would again be to look at holes—this time in the cheese! We believe that import licensing systems are, in most cases, more restrictive than tariffs. An importer knows what a tariff is, and he can plan accordingly. So can the foreign producer. An import licensing system can defeat trade completely and, unfortunately, most import licensing systems usually succeed in defeating to the greatest extent the trade which comes from my country. Denmark, for example, has liberalized 78 percent of its imports from the OEEC area but only 55 percent of its imports from the dollar area. Have you ever tried to buy an American orange or prune, an American cigarette, or an American shirt in Denmark? You can't. Your import licensing system keeps them out completely. This same situation often exists in other countries with import licensing systems. We regret this, and sometimes we do not understand it, particularly in view of the steady increase in dollar holdings in Denmark and other countries of the free world.

Now, however, I am looking at the holes. I would much prefer to look at the cheese. I appreciate the special circumstances which made import licensing systems necessary in many countries, and I recognize that, in some degree at least, they may still be necessary nuisances. It is heartening to see that these systems are gradually being relaxed in most countries. It was particularly encouraging for me to see that Denmark in the past year relaxed its own licensing system to allow more and more goods to enter freely from all parts of the free world, including the dollar area. United States exports to Denmark in 1955 reached almost 640 million kroner as compared with 400 million kroner in 1954. We are hopeful that this trend toward freer dollar trade in Denmark can continue.

Our trade policy, based on the belief that the common prosperity can best be achieved by a higher level of trade in an expanding and free world economy, is also based on the belief that progress toward those ends must be the concern of all the free nations. Each nation, on a reciprocal basis, must do its part. Each nation must have a share in the general effort to raise world standards of living and to free world trade. I can assure you that so far as the United States is concerned we will continue to do our part. We are unalterably convinced that our well-being and prosperity depend upon the common well-being and prosperity.

United Efforts To Meet the World Agricultural Situation

**EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ROME, NOVEMBER 4-25, 1955**

by Earl L. Butz

Some 400 delegates representing 71 member nations of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations met at Rome from November 4 to 25, 1955, for the 8th Conference of the Organization. The United States delegation was composed of Members of Congress, representatives of farm, forestry, and fisheries organizations, and officials of the executive branch of the Government. The congressional representatives were Victor L. Anfuso and Clifford R. Hope.

Unlike previous Conferences, this session faced an appraisal of FAO's activities not only for the 2 years that had elapsed since the 7th Conference in November 1953, but also for the 10 years since the Organization came into being in October 1945. The Conference's principal job, then, was to evaluate the work that had been done by FAO during the past decade and to project its activities to fit the agricultural situation that faces the world today and that is likely to face it in the future.

The delegates had as a basis for their deliberations the Organization's 1955 10-year review and outlook report, *The State of Food and Agriculture*. The report pointed out the remarkable progress that has been made in technical methods of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries and in their utilization; the developments in member countries in

social and economic fields; the increasing awareness of the problems of nutrition and nutritional requirements; the progress that has been made in many countries toward the coordinated programming and development of agricultural resources. It showed how widespread schemes of land reform, and especially measures of price support, have given to farmers in many countries a higher degree of security and economic stability.

The report pointed out that, as a result of these and other developments, world per capita agricultural production had regained its prewar level, despite a drop of from 10 to 15 percent at the end of the war and an increase of nearly 25 percent in world population. But it also showed that production has increased more rapidly in advanced countries than in underdeveloped countries, so that per capita production in Asia and Latin America is still below prewar, while surpluses have built up in the more advanced countries.

Thus, the situation the delegates had to deal with in 1955 was basically the same as in 1953, with surpluses in some countries and continuing undernourishment in others. This situation, the Conference decided, was evidence of a failure to expand effective demand for farm products as rapidly as technical developments made it possible to expand production.

Based on the report and their own assessments of the situation, the delegates concluded, therefore, that it was important to give much greater attention to raising consumption levels. They adopted a resolution calling on governments to examine their policies affecting consumption levels and nu-

• Mr. Butz, author of the above article, is Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. He was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 8th FAO Conference.

tritional needs. The resolution also asked the Director-General of FAO to examine the structure of distribution costs and ways of reducing them, and to aid member governments in strengthening consumer education and in increasing the efficiency of marketing food and agricultural products.

Problem of Surpluses

Along with greater attention to expanding consumption in order to improve nutrition and utilize abundant production, the Conference recommended action aimed at preventing development of additional surpluses. It recognized that further expansion of production was essential, in view of the rapid growth of population and rising standards of living, but stressed, as it had at the Conference in 1953, that any further expansion should be selective, taking into account both expected market demand and nutritional needs.

The Conference also flagged the problem of matching production and demand. Member governments were reminded of their responsibility to help farmers adjust their output, particularly by removing such obstacles as restrictive trade practices and by modifying price policies when those policies favor expansion in directions where it is no longer required. And it concluded that: "An expansion of production, particularly for export, which had developed primarily under the shelter of high support prices in other countries was likely to be precarious."

This conclusion reflected a warning by U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson when, in a message to the Conference,¹ he said:

In some nations today many of us fear that present trends are leading toward "quick return" attitudes, toward single-crop rather than balanced agricultural economies. We see new agricultural production springing up in some countries, not because it is economically justified but only because it can creep under the umbrella-like protection of the United States price support program. . . . I must assure you that any production based on such hope of short-term benefits may sooner or later find its protecting umbrella withdrawn.

Recognizing that flexibility of production was governed in some cases by various systems of supporting agricultural prices, the delegates agreed to ask the Director-General to bring together a group of experts nominated by their governments to study various methods of maintaining farm incomes, their effectiveness, and their effect on flex-

ibility of production, consumption levels, and levels of international trade.

Turning from considering how to expand consumption to use surpluses and adjust production to prevent them, the delegates discussed immediate problems of surplus disposal. The Conference approved the development of principles of surplus disposal by the Organization's Committee on Commodity Problems. These principles had been formally accepted by 37 FAO member governments. It also approved the work of the Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal, which meets at Washington as a forum for airing any problems that member nations want to bring up on surpluses.

Delegates expressed keen interest in the use of surpluses for aiding economic development. In the discussion, based on a pilot study FAO had made in India, the United States made the point that existing U.S. legislation, Public Law 480, provided for using our surpluses for this purpose. The Conference called the attention of other governments to this possible use of surpluses.

The Conference drew conclusions on a number of other parts of the total world food and agriculture situation, such as farm income, agricultural credit, and a number of specific commodity situations. And it increased the membership of the Committee on Commodity Problems from 20 to 24.

The Budget

Another major job of the Conference was to approve the Organization's program of work and budget for the next 2 years. As agreed in advance, the Conference undertook early in the session to establish the level of the budget before dividing into commissions and committees for determining the Organization's future activities. The Director-General had presented the Conference a proposed program of work calling for a budget level of \$7,020,000 for 1956, and \$7,187,000 for 1957.

The problem of establishing the budget turned out to be the most controversial issue of the Conference. A number of delegations wanted to accept the level as proposed by the Director-General. Others, particularly those whose contributions form the larger proportion of the total budget, favored lower amounts.

After considerable debate on the question a figure of \$6,600,000 was voted for 1956, and \$6,800,000 for 1957. More than half of the reductions came out of administrative services. One proposed new

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 934.

project (on international fisheries regulations) was eliminated, and initiation of several new activities was postponed.

Thus, the budget established will enable the Organization to carry out its program substantially as the Director-General had proposed. This program, in addition to an expansion of programs already under way, includes a number of new activities: The Organization will engage in the collection and distribution of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in agriculture and food production as a part of the collective endeavor of the U.N. and the specialized agencies; increase its emphasis on milk and child nutrition in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund; expand its participation in certain joint activities with other international organizations; institute a program of research fellowships; and begin a survey and appraisal of world agricultural, forestry, and fisheries resources in relation to nutrition.

The United States agreed to increase its contribution from 30 percent to 31½ percent for 1956 and 1957 and to 33½ percent beginning in 1958 at a meeting of a working party on the Fao scale of contributions, which met at Rome in March 1955. The agreement was made with two provisos, however—one, that if other countries join Fao the United States would expect to share the benefits of additional contributions of new members; the other, that the ceiling of \$2 million established by Congress on the U.S. contribution to Fao would not be exceeded. The Conference approved the scale of contributions on essentially the basis recommended by the working party.

While the U.S. assessment for each of the next 2 years will be 31½ percent, this does not mean that the United States will contribute 31½ percent of the total Fao budget. Miscellaneous income that Fao gets from sources such as investment of funds in the Working Capital Fund is deducted from the total before the assessments are applied to member governments. The estimated miscellaneous income for 1956 and 1957 is \$140,000 per year. In addition, the United States has an excess credit of \$212,396 from funds remaining in the Working Capital Fund at the end of December 1954. Thus, the U.S. contribution for both years will be less than the current legislative ceiling.

Fao will have about \$8 million available for technical assistance work in 1956—the largest amount since the program began 5 years ago. This

fund is allocated from the U.N. Special Account for the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and is in addition to the \$6,600,000 budget for the regular program.

The Director-General proposed, and the Conference agreed, that there should be closer integration between the activities financed from Fao's regular budget and those financed from the Expanded Technical Assistance Program. The Conference also agreed that the Council and the Conference should be given greater opportunity to consider the planning, development, and execution of Fao's technical assistance activities, even though the ultimate approval of the program lay in the hands of the U.N. Economic and Social Council and the U.N. General Assembly.

The Conference also laid emphasis upon the value that may be derived from regional technical assistance programs and requested the Director-General to press the Technical Assistance Board to raise the proportion of ETAP funds permitted to be used by Fao for regional projects.

SUNFED

The Conference adopted a resolution urging the establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development within the U.N.—a plan for providing grants and low-interest loans to promote the economic development of underdeveloped countries. This has been under discussion in the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly for the past 5 years. The resolution was passed over the opposition of the United States and a number of other countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand; in the final voting, the United States as well as the above group of countries abstained.

United States opposition to the resolution was based on two factors: first, that this Conference was not the appropriate place for such a resolution; second, that the United States felt that adoption of the resolution could and probably would be misinterpreted—that it would raise hopes in some countries of early availability of aid or credit which is likely not to be immediately forthcoming. Oris V. Wells, speaking for the United States delegation, warned that—

... we think the adoption of this resolution could well turn out to be a cruel deception. It will also focus attention upon the possible use of outside aid rather than concentrating major attention upon what member nations

and their own nationals may themselves do . . . we think that this is where the major problem and the major hope for successful economic development center.

Liaison With the U.N.

The Conference adopted a resolution, which was introduced jointly by the United States and Canada, indicating that the Director-General might fully utilize the services of the North American Regional Office in maintaining and strengthening liaison with the United Nations. In so doing the Director-General could prescribe procedures which would allow an appropriate officer stationed at U.N. headquarters to maintain direct communications with Fao headquarters at Rome, and at the same time also prescribe procedures to assure effective working relationships between such an officer and the North American Regional Office.

Committee To Examine Work of Council and Standing Committees

Another resolution—also introduced by the United States jointly with other countries—for appointing an *ad hoc* committee to look into the functions of the various policymaking bodies of Fao was approved. The committee will seek ways to achieve economies and greater efficiency in the operations of the Council, the Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Financial Control, and the Committee on Commodity Problems. The United States will be a member of this committee along with five other countries and an independent chairman, Sir Donald Vandepuer, former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries of the United Kingdom.

Council Elections

S. A. Hasnic, Secretary of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture of Pakistan, was unanimously elected as independent chairman of the Fao Council for the next 2 years. He succeeded Josue de Castro of Brazil, who had held the office since 1951. The Council is the governing body of Fao between biennial sessions of the Conference.

Sixteen vacancies on the 24-member Fao Council were also filled by elections—8 to take office immediately after the Conference, and 8 on January 1, 1957. The United States, whose membership would expire at the end of 1956, was reelected along with Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, Japan, the Philippines, and Spain. Belgium,

Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Syria, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa replace other members on the Council. The remaining 8 countries, whose terms do not expire until the next Conference in November 1957, are Australia, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, India, Sweden, Switzerland, and Thailand.

The United Kingdom, whose term expired at this session of the Conference, was not reelected. This is the first time since the Council's beginning in September 1947 that the U.K. has not been elected to a seat on the Council. Following the announcement of the results of the elections, Francis Deak, spokesman for the United States delegation, led off with a statement of profound regret that the United Kingdom was eliminated from the Council. A large number of other delegates followed with similar statements of regret.

Associate Membership

The Conference approved amendments to the constitution to provide for admission as associate members of Fao territories or groups of territories that are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations. The constitutional amendments on this delicate question had been painstakingly developed and considered by the Fao Council during the 2 years intervening since the last Conference. Even so, the Conference, through its Committee on Constitutional and Legal Questions, devoted long hours to debate on many of the same points that had been labored so heavily in the Council.

As finally approved, the amendments provide that associate members will participate with member nations in the activities of the Organization, except that they will not have the right to vote or hold office in the Conference or its commissions and committees and will not be eligible for election to the Council or to the committees whose members are chosen by election.

New Member

Tunisia became the 72d member of Fao at this Conference. Full membership for the North African state was proposed by France when that country decided that the associate membership provisions were too restricted for Tunisia. The Conference admitted the new member by a vote of 33 to 4, with 26 countries abstaining.

Tenth Anniversary Observance

On November 4, the opening day of the Conference, a special plenary session was devoted to a commemoration of Fao's 10th anniversary. Representative Clifford R. Hope of Kansas, who has been associated with Fao's activities since its beginning in October 1945, was chosen as the spokesman for North America. Mr. Hope spoke on "The Economic Aspects of Fao in a Changing World." Other speakers were Emilio Colombo, the Italian Minister of Agriculture, Joaquin M. Elizalde of the Philippines, and André Mayer of France. Dr. Antonio Segni, Prime Minister of Italy, attended the commemoration observance.

Opening of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency

The following was released to the press on February 27 by the Working Level Meeting on the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The first session of the Working Level Meeting to consider the text of the statute for an International Atomic Energy Agency convened on February 27 at the Department of State. Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, chairman of the United States delegation, took the chair and welcomed the representatives of the 11 other nations on behalf of the United States as host. The other chairmen of delegations are: Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador; Pierre Ryckmans, Belgian Commissioner of Atomic Energy; João Carlos Muniz, Brazilian Ambassador; A. D. P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador; Ambassador Pavel Winkler, Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador; Dr. H. J. Bhabha, Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy; Luis Esteves Fernandes, Portuguese Ambassador; J. E. Holloway, South African Ambassador; Georgi N. Zaroubin, Soviet Ambassador; and Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador.

The purpose of the meeting is to produce for submission to a future international conference a text for the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency first proposed by President Eisenhower in a speech made before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953. Con-

sideration is being given at this meeting to observations made during discussions at the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1955 and to comments received from states not represented in the meeting which have reviewed the draft statute circulated on August 22, 1955.¹ The discussions are being held in private in order to facilitate a full and frank exchange of views and rapid progress toward the goal of an agreed statute.

Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi

Statement by Benjamin Gerig²

After examining the annual report of the Government of Belgium on its administration of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi³ and the supplementary explanations presented by the Special Representative, my delegation considers that progress generally is being made. However, in certain aspects of political development—and also in the field of educational development—certain questions remain in our mind.

Though we appreciate that the administration accepts the principle of closer union between the two *pays* of Ruanda and Urundi, we wonder whether sufficiently concrete plans are being developed to bring about such union. We fully recognize that efforts to unite peoples who have been ethnically, historically, and traditionally distinct for so many years is no easy job. In developing the two *pays* toward the objectives of self-government—either as a unitary state or within the framework of a federal union—we would urge that continued and diligent efforts be made to accustom the inhabitants to more democratic methods, with a constantly broadening electoral base, and that continued efforts be made to show the advantages of closer union of these two *pays*.

We believe that political development should be given due emphasis in the plans of all administering authorities. We wonder whether in Ruanda-Urundi political development is in fact keeping

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

² Made in the Trusteeship Council on Feb. 16 (U.S./U.N. press release 2355). Mr. Gerig is deputy U.S. representative to the Council; Mason Sears, the U.S. representative, is currently President of the Council.

³ U.N. doc. T/1201.

pace with the steps being taken in economic and social development.

We are convinced that continued expansion of the powers and functions of the various councils throughout the territory will be an important step toward political advancement. It is worthy of note that the native councils set up in 1952 have continued to function and that the two High Councils of Ruanda and Urundi have been active and interested in the administration of local affairs. The fact that the Mwami are no longer exerting the rights of individual decision in the High Councils is a development of importance. My delegation hopes that the councils will continue to develop in a more representative manner and that the aims of the administration will be to establish as soon as possible a direct electorate adapted to local conditions on the basis of adult suffrage.

My delegation wishes to commend the administration on its continued efforts to abolish the "ubuhake" system⁴—a project requiring great patience and effort. As the system progressively diminishes, we hope that it will be possible to establish a meat industry within the territory.

In noting the various economic programs, my delegation would like to commend the administration on its efforts to improve the standard of living for inhabitants of the trust territory—particularly its efforts to tackle the soil erosion and reforestation problem and to provide adequate drainage and water supply. We agree that the introduction of manioc as a food product, which can be stored in the ground for 2½ years, will be helpful in avoiding possible future famines. We were glad to learn of the pilot projects initiated in both *pays* to study the biological balance between man, earth, vegetation, water, and cattle and will await their findings with great interest.

My delegation hopes that the imminent establishment of the Ruzizi hydroelectric plant will be a decided help in initiating secondary industries and that efforts will be made to train the indigenous inhabitants for increasingly responsible positions in such enterprises.

We were glad to see that the number of gainfully employed has been increasing each year. We feel that the rate of industrialization necessary for dealing with the population problem is

not yet satisfactory. But we think that, as the 10-year plan for economic and social development gets more fully under way, more opportunities for gainful employment will open up and a rapidly increasing number of the inhabitants will be able to make a living outside of agriculture.

The Administering Authority should be commended for carrying out the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council to abolish penal sanctions for breach of labor contracts—a measure which becomes effective in 1955.

While we appreciate that relations between management and employees can often be worked out through company unions, we feel nevertheless that, with growing industrialization taking place in the territory, unions on a wider industrial basis should be developed, and we have no doubt that the Administering Authority is fully aware of this problem and will give such unions all appropriate assistance.

Mr. President, my Government believes the Council should commend the Administering Authority for its fine achievements in the educational field. It seems to me that anyone who reads the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's latest observations on the annual reports before us, contained in document T/1223 of February 1, 1956, would agree with our opinion on this point. These observations show that steadily rising appropriations are devoted to education (paragraph 4), that a remarkably high percentage of education funds are devoted to capital works (paragraph 6), that the total number of children at school has risen constantly and has more than doubled between 1950 and 1954 (paragraph 12), that the number of girls in school has steadily expanded to 27 percent of the total (paragraph 13), and that the expansion of vocational education is noted with satisfaction by UNESCO (paragraph 22). My delegation was also pleased to hear the Special Representative say that a second university is soon to be opened in the Congo, which will give Ruanda-Urundi students additional opportunities for higher education. These are all achievements of which Belgium may well be proud.

My delegation hopes that the day will not be too far distant when Ruanda-Urundi will have its own university to meet the growing needs of its dense population and expanding educational system. We also wish to commend the Administering Authority for its steady expansion of teacher

⁴ The practice of holding cattle as a form of wealth rather than for consumption.

training facilities and to express the hope that it will continue to give increasing attention to the need for more and more qualified teachers. Finally, Mr. Chairman, my delegation shares the view of the last two Visiting Missions that the advantages of higher education in Europe and the Americas far outweigh the disadvantages, and we hope that the Administering Authority will grant further scholarships for study abroad.

Mr. Bowman To Represent U.S. on ECOSOC Statistical Commission

The Department of State announced on February 28 (press release 99) that Raymond T. Bowman had been sworn in that day as representative of the United States on the Statistical Commission of the United Nations. Mr. Bowman's nomination was confirmed on February 9, 1956, and, in accordance with the requirement of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, will be submitted also for confirmation by the Council at its 21st session.

The Statistical Commission is one of eight functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The ninth session is scheduled to be held at Headquarters, New York, April 16 to May 4, 1956. Among the items on the agenda for this session are the following: general survey of developments in international statistics; statistics of capital formation; classification of government financial accounts; balance-of-payments statistics; external trade statistics; minimum program of economic and social statistics; and national accounts.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Economic and Social Council

Slavery. Comments received on the Draft Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and Servitude submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom. Belgium. E/2679/Add.5, January 6, 1956. 1 p. mimeo.

Action taken upon decisions reached by the Ninth Session of the Commission on the Status of Women, 14 March-1 April 1955. (Report prepared by the Secretary-General.) E/CN.6/278, January 18, 1956. 10 pp. mimeo.

Commission on the Status of Women. Information concerning the Status of Women in Non-Self-Governing Territories. (Report by the Secretary-General.) E/CN.6/279, January 20, 1956. 10 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Provisional Agenda of the Seventeenth Session of the Trusteeship Council, to be convened at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 7 February 1956, at 11 a. m. T/1216, January 3, 1956. 33 pp. mimeo.

Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories. Note by the Secretary-General. T/1219, January 16, 1956. 1 p. mimeo.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration of Tanganyika, 1954. Note by the Secretary-General. T/1221, January 16, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration of the Cameroons under British Administration, 1954. Note by the Secretary-General. T/1222, January 16, 1956. 7 pp. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York, June 4, 1954.¹

Accession deposited: Viet-Nam, January 31, 1956.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.¹

Accession deposited: Viet-Nam January 31, 1956.

Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 15, 1956.

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.¹

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 15, 1956.

Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

Adherence effective: Spain, March 2, 1956.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955.²

Notification by Australia of extension to: Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, February 12, 1956.

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: February 22, 1956.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, March 10, 1955.⁴

Signature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.³

Agreement on Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.⁴

Signature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.³

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.⁴

Signature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.³

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.⁴

Signature: Belgium, February 16, 1956.³

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955.⁴

Signatures: Belgium, February 16, 1956;³ Australia, February 17, 1956.

BILATERAL

Dominican Republic

Agreement for a cooperative agriculture program pursuant to the general agreement for technical cooperation of February 20, 1951 (TIAS 2226). Effected by exchange of notes at Ciudad Trujillo June 22 and 30. Entered into force June 30, 1955. TIAS 3420.

Notice of intention to terminate given by the Dominican Republic: January 27, 1956 (in accordance with article XIV, para. 1, the agreement will terminate February 26, 1956).

Iran

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Tehran February 20, 1956. Entered into force February 20, 1956.

Turkey

Agreement relating to passport visas and visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington June 27, August 8, September 27, and October 11, 1955. Entered into force October 11, 1955.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

U.S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community

The Department of State announced on February 20 the establishment of a U.S. mission to the European Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg City, Luxembourg, effective February 26, 1956.¹ Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth has been designated U.S. Representative in charge of the U.S. mission.

¹ Signed "subject to ratification."

⁴ Not in force.

³ For an earlier announcement, see BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

March 12, 1956

Resignations

Avra M. Warren as Ambassador to Turkey, effective March 30.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 88 dated February 17

The Department of State on February 25 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Volume I, General*. This volume is comprised entirely of the Department's documentary record of the events leading to the outbreak of World War II and the various aspects of that war. The great majority of the documents in this volume have not previously been published and tell graphically the events of that tragic year as seen by American diplomats.

The story of the coming of World War II is presented in 401 pages divided into eight chapters which cover speculation as to Axis designs, the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, tension following that occupation, President Roosevelt's peace messages of April 14 to Germany and Italy, increasing German pressure on Poland, unsuccessful Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union for an agreement on support against aggression, German-Soviet relations culminating in the Treaty of Nonaggression signed at Moscow on August 23, and final appeals for peace by President Roosevelt.

Of particular interest are the documents on the failure of British and French efforts to reach an acceptable understanding with the Soviet Government and the turning of the latter to a deal with Hitler. Stumbling blocks to an Anglo-French-Soviet agreement were reported to be: (1) the distrust by Poland and Rumania of the Soviet Union, which led them to refuse to agree to the entry of Soviet troops for their defense; (2) the terms of the Soviet nonaggression proposal, which was interpreted as giving the Soviet Union a free hand to occupy the Baltic States and perhaps other countries at its own discretion; (3) and the insistence by the Soviet Union upon delaying a

political agreement until other military agreements were negotiated.

The beginning of the European war is covered by 10 chapters including the start of the war, the intervention of the Soviet Union in Poland, the Boundary and Friendship Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, peace movements, appeals of President Roosevelt against aerial bombardment of civilian populations, and minor subjects. Other sections cover the impact of the war upon the United States giving rise to problems of repatriation of Americans, neutrality policy, control of commerce by belligerent governments, and measures to secure adequate supplies of raw materials. The final chapter of this volume deals with the concern of the United States over Soviet demands on Finland and the subsequent invasion of Finland by Soviet forces.

Two other *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1939 have already been published: *Volume III, The Far East*; and *Volume IV, The Far East, The Near East and Africa*. The series of five volumes for 1939 will be completed by *Volume II, General, The British Commonwealth of Nations, and Europe*; and *Volume V, The American Republics*.

Copies of *Volume I* (viii, 1059 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$4.50 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Relief Supplies and Equipment—Duty-Free Entry and Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3119. Pub. 5765. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo October 30, 1954. Entered into force October 30, 1954.

Tax Relief Techniques on Defense Expenditures. TIAS 3120. Pub. 5809. 6 pp. 5¢.

Arrangement between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Dated at The Hague May 29 and June 22, 1953. Entered into force June 22, 1953.

Exchange of Official Publications. TIAS 3121. Pub. 5770. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington October 27, 1954. Entered into force October 27, 1954.

Technical Cooperation—Program of Industrial Productivity. TIAS 3122. Pub. 5779. 23 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador May 14, 1953. Entered into force May 14, 1953.

Loan Agreement. TIAS 3126. Pub. 5774. 72 pp. 25¢.

Agreement between the United States and the European Coal and Steel Community—Supplementing and amending agreement of April 23, 1954—Signed at Luxembourg December 8, 1954, and at Washington December 16, 1954. Entered into force December 16, 1954. And act of pledge—Dated November 28, 1954.

Relief Supplies and Equipment—Duty-Free Entry and Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3128. Pub. 5784. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima October 21 and 25, 1954. Entered into force October 29, 1954.

Technical Cooperation—Joint Commission for Economic Development. TIAS 3129. Pub. 5785. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Paraguay—Terminating agreement of November 9, 22, and 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Asunción February 13 and 24, 1954. Entered into force February 24, 1954.

Naval Mission to Brazil. TIAS 3130. Pub. 5786. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Extending and amending agreement of May 7, 1942. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 29 and October 9, 1954. Entered into force October 9, 1954; operative retroactively May 7, 1954.

Pacific Ocean Weather Stations. TIAS 3132. Pub. 5792. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa June 4 and 28, 1954. Entered into force June 28, 1954.

Civil Aviation Mission to Peru. TIAS 3134. Pub. 5810. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Extending agreement of December 27, 1946, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Lima December 27, 1949, and February 8, 1950. Entered into force February 8, 1950.

Relief Supplies and Packages. TIAS 3135. Pub. 5978. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of letters—Signed at Frankfurt am Main, Bonn, and Bonn-Petersberg April 10, May 25, and June 7, 1951. Entered into force May 29, 1951; operative retroactively December 29, 1949.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Disposition of Surplus Equipment and Material. TIAS 3136. Pub. 5973. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy. Exchange of notes—Dated at Rome November 20 and December 14, 1951. Entered into force December 14, 1951.

Relief Supplies and Packages. TIAS 3137. Pub. 5976. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Amending agreement of April 10, May 25, and June 7, 1951. Exchange of letters—Signed at Bad Godesberg and Bonn July 8 and September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 6, 1952; operative retroactively July 1, 1952.

Africa. Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig)	438
Agriculture. United Efforts To Meet the World Agricultural Situation (Butz)	434
Asia	
First Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	403
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	409
U.S. Delegation Leaves for SEATO Council Meeting (Dulles)	408
Atomic Energy. Opening of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency	438
Belgium. Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig)	438
Congress, The. The Problem of Disarmament (Dulles)	415
Denmark. U.S. Trade Policy and Problems (Coe)	429
Disarmament. The Problem of Disarmament (Dulles)	415
Economic Affairs	
Mr. Bowman To Represent U.S. on ECOSOC Statistical Commission	440
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	409
U.S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community	441
U.S. Trade Policy and Problems (Coe)	429
Europe	
Balloon Flights in Eastern Europe (Lodge)	428
U.S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community	441
Foreign Service	
Resignations (Warren)	441
U.S. Mission to Coal and Steel Community	441
India. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	409
International Organizations and Meetings	
First Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	403
Opening of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency	438
U.S. Delegation Leaves for SEATO Council Meeting (Dulles)	408
Italy. Visit of Italian President Gronchi (statements and addresses)	417
Mutual Security. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	409
Near East. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	409
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig)	438
Publications	
Foreign Relations Volume	441
Recent Releases	442
Science	
Color Television Demonstrations for Foreign Visitors	428
U.S. Restates Position on Weather Balloons (texts of notes)	426

Treaty Information. Current Actions	440
Turkey. Resignations (Warren)	441
U.S.S.R.	
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference	409
U.S. Restates Position on Weather Balloons (texts of notes)	426
United Nations	
Balloon Flights in Eastern Europe (Lodge)	428
Mr. Bowman To Represent U.S. on ECOSOC Statistical Commission	440
Color Television Demonstrations for Foreign Visitors	428
Current U.N. Documents	440
Political and Economic Developments in Ruanda-Urundi (Gerig)	438
United Efforts To Meet the World Agricultural Situation (Butz)	434

Name Index

Bowman, Raymond T	440
Butz, Earl L	434
Coe, Robert D.	429
Dulles, Secretary	408, 409, 415
Eisenhower, President	417
Gronchi, Giovanni	417, 418
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr	428
Nixon, Richard M	417
Warren, Avra M	441

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: February 27-March 4

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Press release issued prior to February 27 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 88 of February 17.

No.	Date	Subject
97	2/27	Nixon and Gronchi arrival statements.
*98	2/27	Fletcher Warren nominated ambassador to Turkey.
99	2/28	Bowman sworn in as U.S. representative on U.N. Statistical Commission (rewrite).
100	2/28	Dulles: news conference.
101	2/29	Dulles: testimony on disarmament.
102	2/29	SEATO delegation.
103	2/29	ITU color TV demonstrations.
*104	2/29	Program for President Gronchi.
*105	2/29	Robert C. Hill nominated Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
*106	2/29	Nominations for career ambassador.
†107	3/1	Dulles: testimony on OTC.
108	3/1	SEATO Council report.
109	3/1	Reply to U.S.S.R. on weather balloons.
*110	3/1	Educational exchange.
†111	3/2	Surplus commodity agreement with Indonesia.
112	3/2	Dulles: departure for SEATO meeting.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300
(GPO)



the
Department
of
State

KNOW YOUR FOREIGN POLICY . . .
read

The Department of State **Bulletin**

. . . a weekly publication for everyone
who is interested in America's
place in the world of nations.

The *Bulletin* holds a distinguished place among periodicals in the field of international affairs. It brings you policy statements and authoritative articles dealing with such topics as security for the free world, foreign economic policy, and other phases of our international relations.

The *Bulletin* gives you the United States position on United Nations issues through official statements, texts of resolutions, and feature articles on the accomplishments of the United Nations and its special agencies.

Newspaper columnists, radio commentators, lawyers, historians, and educators rely on the *Bulletin*.

Place your subscription to the *Bulletin* with the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. The subscription price for 52 issues is \$7.50 domestic, \$10.25 foreign. Single copy, 20 cents.

Order Form

To: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

Enclosed find:

\$
(cash, check, or
money order).

Please enter my subscription to the *Department of State Bulletin*.

Name:

Street Address:

City, Zone, and State:

VOID